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ChoiceGAPs: Competitive Diffusion as a Massive
Multi-Player Game in Social Networks
Edoardo Serra, Francesca Spezzano and V.S. Subrahmanian
We consider the problem of modeling competitive diffusion in real world social networks via
the notion of ChoiceGAPs which combine choice logic programs due to Sacca` and Zaniolo and
Generalized Annotated Programs due to Kifer and Subrahmanian. We assume that each vertex
in a social network is a player in a multi-player game (with a huge number of players) — the
choice part of the ChoiceGAPs describe utilities of players for acting in various ways based on
utilities of their neighbors in those and other situations. We define multi-player Nash equilibrium
for such programs — but because they require some conditions that are hard to satisfy in the real
world, we introduce a new model-theoretic concept of strong equilibrium. We show that stable
equilibria can capture all Nash equilibria. We prove a host of complexity (intractability) results
for checking existence of strong equilibria (as well as related counting complexity results), together
with algorithms to find them. We then identify a class of ChoiceGAPs for which stable equilibria
can be polynomially computed. We develop algorithms for computing these equilibria under
various restrictions. We come up with the important concept of an estimation query which can
compute quantities w.r.t. a given strong equilibrium, and approximate ranges of values (answers)
across the space of strong equilibria. Even though we show that computing range answers to
estimation queries exactly is intractable, we are able to identify classes of estimation queries that
can be answered in polynomial time. We report on experiments we conducted with a real-world
FaceBook data set surrounding the 2013 Italian election showing that our algorithms have good
predictive accuracy with an Area Under a ROC Curve that, on average, is over 0.76.
I.2.4 [Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Methods]: Representations (procedural
and rule-based); I.2.3 [Deduction and Theorem Proving]: Logic Programming
General Terms: Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Social network, competitive diffusion, generalized annotated
programs, game theory
1. INTRODUCTION
The need to understand and predict the results of diffusion in social networks
has taken on great importance in recent years. Most past work assumes a non-
competitive scenario in which we model diffusion of one phenomenon at a time.
However, in the real world, multiple competing phenomena are often diffusing con-
currently. For instance, the “likes” for a political candidate A and a competing
candidate B might be mutually exclusive — a person may support at most one of
them. Likewise, two competing marketing campaigns, one each for the iOS and
Edoardo Serra, Francesca Spezzano and V.S. Subrahmanian are with the University of Maryland
Institute for Advanced Computer Studies (UMIACS), College Park, MD 20742, USA.
Permission to make digital/hard copy of all or part of this material without fee for personal
or classroom use provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial
advantage, the ACM copyright/server notice, the title of the publication, and its date appear, and
notice is given that copying is by permission of the ACM, Inc. To copy otherwise, to republish,
to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.
c© 2018 ACM 0000-0000/2018/0000-0001 $5.00
, Vol. V, No. N, September 2018, Pages 1–0??.
ar
X
iv
:1
41
0.
61
18
v3
  [
cs
.L
O]
  8
 Ju
n 2
01
6
2 · ChoiceGAPs: Competitive Diffusion as a Massive Multi-Player Game in Social Networks
Android platforms, may garner “likes” from supporters of each but it is unlikely
that they will both get “likes” from the same person. In a similar vein, various
“issues” may have supporters - for instance, in the US, there are “pro” and “anti”
abortion supporters, “pro” and “anti” immigration supporters, “pro” and “anti”
Obamacare (Mr. Obama’s 2014 health care law) supporters, and so forth. In all
these cases, people typically choose at most one of these positions.
In this paper, we present the ChoiceGAP framework using which we can model
competing diffusive processes via a mix of generalized annotated programs (GAPs)
due to Kifer and Subrahmanian [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992] and Choice Logic
Programs proposed by Sacca` and Zaniolo [Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990]. The use of
GAPs to model diffusion processes was already proposed in [Shakarian et al. 2013;
Broecheler et al. 2010] — there, the authors show how many well-known diffusion
models can be expressed as GAPs.1 [Shakarian et al. 2013] assumes only one
diffusive process is occurring at a time and that there is no competition going on.
[Broecheler et al. 2010] presents first steps toward modeling competitive diffusion
but do so by identifying one solution of a convex set of nonlinear (conic) constraints.
They do not present complexity results, nor do they present accuracy results based
on real data. Moreover, their framework usually takes hours to compute.
When members of a social network can choose at most one of n different compet-
ing positions, we first use n different diffusion models, each capturing how support
for each of the competing positions spreads through a social network. Each vertex
in the social network can be considered to be a player in the game with one of
n + 1 choices to make. He can either choose one of the competing positions or he
can choose none – he can never choose more than one. The players’ utility (for a
given course of action, e.g. being pro-Obamacare) is defined by a choice rule that
uses inputs from the n different GAPs. We can think of the spread of support for
a political candidate in a social network as a “game” in which the Nash equilib-
rium [Nash 1950] represents a stable adoption of positions by the members of the
social network. When a Nash equilibrium occurs, no player has an incentive to
deviate from his current position.
After introducing the syntax and semantics of ChoiceGAPs in Section 3, we for-
mally define our game and the notions of “strong” and “Nash” equlibria in Section 5.
Unfortunately, Nash equilibria require assumptions that are unrealistic in real world
social networks. We show that every game (in our sense) can be expressed using
a ChoiceGAP in such a way that the Nash equilibrium and the strong equilibrium
coincide — thus, strong equilibria capture all the good points of Nash equilibria
(for our games) without inheriting any of the disadvantages. We then study the
complexity of various problems relating to these equilibria in Section 6. Specifically,
and perhaps unsurprisingly, we show that these problems are computationally in-
tractable.
1Specifically, the authors of [Shakarian et al. 2013] show that they can express cascade models
such as [Cha et al. 2009a] used to model the spread of “favorites” in Flickr, tipping models such as
the Jackson-Yariv model of product adoption in economics [Jackson and Yariv 2005], the SIR and
the SIS models of disease spread [Anderson and May 1979; Hethcote 1976], as well as homophilic
models such as those involving mobile phone usage [Aral et al. 2009]. Thus, GAPs can be used to
represent many different diffusion models and hence we do not repeat these representations here.
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Then, in Section 7, we provide mixed integer linear programs (MILPs for short) to
capture coherent models of ChoiceGAPs and then use these MILPs in an algorithm
to compute all strong equilibria. Because Section 6 shows that problems relating to
the concept of our equilibra are intractable, we identify a class of ChoiceGAPs called
“Vertex Independent Choice” (or VIC) programs and show that for a class of these
called V IC2 programs, we can find a strong equilibrium in polynomial time (and
they are guaranteed to exist). However, the problem of finding all such equilibria is
not likely to be polynomially computable. Section 9 looks at “queries” that a user
may wish to express in such social network games – typically these queries compute
expected diffusions of competing concepts. We develop algorithms to answer such
queries under different assumptions.
Section 10 describes experiments we have carried out pertaining to a competi-
tive situation during the 2013 Italian election using data gathered from FaceBook.
We considered 4 different “competitions” and tested our algorithms with various
combinations of diffusion models. We measured accuracy of our algorithms using
the standard “Area Under ROC Curve” or AUROC metric. A receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve plots false positive rates on the x-axis and true-positive
rates on the y-axis. The AUROC is the area under the resulting curve. An AU-
ROC of 0.5 shows the algorithm has no predictive power. Depending upon the
settings used in our algorithms, our experiments show that our algorithms achieve
an avverage AUROC of 0.762, showing good predictive accuracy.
2. A SIMPLE MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Suppose we want to study an election (say in the UK) between Labour and Tories
using a social network such as FaceBook. Adoption of “likes” on FaceBook may
diffuse through the network in accordance with a diffusion model for each party as
shown below.2
DM Labour =

voteLabour(A) : X ← suptBrown(A) : X
voteLabour(B) : X ← voteLabour(A) : X, knows(B,A) : 1
voteLabour(B) : X ← voteLabour(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
student(B) : 1
voteLabour(B) : X ← voteLabour(A) : X, olderRel(B,A) : 1
DM Tory =

voteTory(A) : X ← likeCam(A) : X
voteTory(B) : X ← voteTory(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
employee(B) : 1
voteTory(B) : X ← voteTory(A) : X, idol(B,A) : 1,
young(B) : 1
Here, voteLabour(A) : X and voteTory(A) : Y denote the probabilities (X,Y ) of
the vertex A voting for Labour, resp. Tory, with value X and Y , respectively. The
second rule in DM Labour can intuitively be read as “If B knows A with 100%
certainty and A will vote for Labour with X% certainty, then B will vote Labour
with X% certainty.
2We will give a formal definition of diffusion models later.
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Conflicting predicate symbols are specified explicitly in advance by the user or
application. For instance, voteLabour() and voteTory() are conflicting predicate
symbols because a user may have at most one of these two properties.3 In contrast,
predicates like mentor() and idol() may not be conflicting. Consequently, each
person (vertex in the network) must choose the party to vote for according to his
maximal utility, and then spread “good” vibes about his chosen party through the
network.
For each conflicting vertex predicate vp, we introduce a ”utility” predicate vpU
and a ”decision” predicate vpD. The former contains the utility value of the corre-
sponding choice, while the latter represents the vertex’s actual choice. Given a set
of conflicting predicate symbols, for each vertex, only one corresponding decision
atom must have a value greater than 0 and equal to the value of the corresponding
utility atom, while others must have value 0. A ChoiceGAP (to be formally defined
later) characterizing this situation is shown below. Such ChoiceGAPs can be au-
tomatically constructed once the set of conflicting predicates is specified and once
the diffusion models for those individual predicates is known.
voteLabourU (A) : X ← suptBrown(A) : X
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, knows(B,A) : 1
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
student(B) : 1
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, olderRel(B,A) : 1
voteToryU (A) : X ← likeCam(A) : X
voteToryU (B) : X ← voteToryD(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
employee(B) : 1
voteToryU (B) : X ← voteToryD(A) : X, idol(B,A) : 1,
young(B) : 1
voteToryD(X), voteLabourD(X) ←↩ voteToryU (X), voteLabourU (X)
Each competing predicate symbol voteLabour and voteTory in our example dif-
fusion models DM Labour,DM Tory respectively, thus has the associated predicate
symbols voteLabourU and voteLabourD.
When constructing a ChoiceGAP from a set of diffusion models, the conflicting
predicates appearing in a rule head are replaced by the corresponding utility pred-
icates, while the conflicting predicates appearing in the body are substituted by
the corresponding decision predicates. Thus, the utility atoms for a vertex directly
depend on the decision atoms of other vertexes. For instance, in the second rule
above, we have voteLaborU (B) : X ← voteLaborD(A) : X, knows(B,A) : 1. This
rule says that if A decides to vote labor with certainty X and B knows A for
sure (100% certainty) then the utility to B of voting for labor is also X. Note
that when individual diffusion models (which have no utility/decision predicates)
are combined, the resulting ChoiceGAPs have such predicates clearly distinguishing
utility predicates and decision predicates.
The last rule of the above ChoiceGAP is a “new type” of rule, called a Vertex
3Throughout this paper, we assume that conflicting predicate symbols are always unary, denoting a
property of a user (vertex), e.g. vote-Labour vs. voteTory or pro-Obamacare vs. anti-Obamacare.
, Vol. V, No. N, September 2018.
Serra et al. · 5
Choice rule (VC-rule for short), requiring that a vertex can only vote for one party.
The body of the rule indicates the possible choices for a vertex, while the head
contains the possible decisions. This rule imposes the fact that each vertex must
choose according to utility values reported in its utility atoms and make a single
choice, i.e. only one decision atom for that vertex is true.
Roughly speaking, each vertex operates like a diffusion model filter by deciding
to spread one of the competing diffusion models — this model is selected according
to the utility function. The vertex does not spread any other competing predicate.
Example 1. Suppose Tom is a student (student(Tom) : 1) who likes Cameron
with certainty 0.6 (likeCam(Tom) : 0.6), but who has a mentor John (mentor(John,
Tom) : 1) who votes for Labour with certainty 0.8 (voteLabour(John) : 0.8). By the
rules in the previous ChoiceGAPs Tom’s utilities are as follows: voteToryU (Tom) :
0.6 or voteLabourU (Tom) : 0.8. As Tom’s utility is bigger if he votes for Labour,
the right choice for him is to vote for Labour: voteLabourD(Tom) : 0.8 and
voteToryD(Tom) : 0. Thus, Tom diffuses his choice through the Labour diffusion
model DM Labour to his neighbors. 2
3. CHOICE GAPS
In this section, we formally define a social network (SN) and introduce the Choice
Generalized Annotated Program ( cGAP) paradigm.
3.1 Social Network Formalization
We assume the existence of two arbitrary but fixed disjoint sets V P,EP of vertex
and edge predicate symbols respectively. Each vertex predicate symbol has arity 1
and each edge predicate symbol has arity 2.
Definition 3.1. A social network is a 5-tuple (V, E, lvert, ledge, w) where:
(1) V is a finite set whose elements are called vertices.
(2) E ⊆ V× V is a finite multi-set whose elements are called edges.
(3) lvert : V→ 2V P is a function, called the vertex labeling function.
(4) ledge : E→ EP is a function, called the edge labeling function.
(5) w : E → [0, 1] is a function, called a weight function. 2
3.2 Syntax of Choice GAPs (cGAPs)
A cGAP consists of two parts:
(1) An “annotation” language;
(2) A logical language that is connected to the annotation language via certain
shared syntactic elements.
3.2.1 cGAP Annotation Language. Let AV ar be a set of symbols (called “an-
notated variable symbols”) ranging over the unit real interval [0, 1] and let F be
a set of symbols (called “annotation function symbols”), each with an associated
arity.
Definition 3.2 Annotation. Annotations are inductively defined as follows:
(1) Any member of [0, 1] ∪AV ar is an annotation.
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(2) If f ∈ F is an n-ary annotation function symbol and t1, . . . , tn are annotations,
then f(t1, . . . , tn) is an annotation. 2
As in the case of Generalized Annotated Programs [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992],
note that each annotation function symbol f of arity i denotes some fixed pre-
theoretically defined function from [0, 1]i to [0, 1].
3.2.2 cGAP Logical Language. We define a separate logical language whose con-
stants are members of V and whose predicate symbols consist of V P ∪EP . We also
assume the existence of a set V of variables ranging over the constants (vertices).
No function symbols are present. Terms and atoms are defined in the usual way
(cf. [Lloyd 1987]). If A = p(t1, . . . , tn) is an atom and p ∈ V P (resp. p ∈ EP ),
then A is called a vertex (resp. edge) atom.
Definition 3.3 Annotated atom/ GAP-rule/GAP. If A is an atom and µ is an
annotation, then A : µ is an annotated atom. If A is a vertex (resp. edge) atom,
then A : µ is also called a vertex (resp. edge) annotated atom. If A0 : f(µ1, . . . , µn),
A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn are annotated atoms, then
A0 : f(µ1, . . . , µn)← A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn
is an annotated rule. When n = 0, the above rule is called a fact. A generalized
annotated program (GAP) is a finite set of annotated rules. An annotated atom
(resp. a rule, a GAP) is ground iff there are no occurrence of variables from either
AVar or V in it. 2
Every social network SN = (V, E, lvert, ledge, w) can be represented by the set of
GAP-rules (actually facts) ΠSN = {q(v) : 1← | v ∈ V ∧ q ∈ lvert(v)} ∪ {ep(v1, v2) :
w(〈v1, v2〉)← | 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ E∧ledge(〈v1, v2〉) = ep}. To construct a GAP from a social
network SN , we look at each vertex v and each property q. If v has property q, then
q(v) : 1← is inserted into ΠSN . Likewise, we look at each edge (v1, v2) ∈ E. If this
edge has weight w and edge property ep, then we insert the fact ep(v1, v2) : w ←
into ΠSN . [Shakarian et al. 2013] has already shown that many classical diffusion
models such as the SIR and SIS models for disease spread [Anderson and May 1979;
Hethcote 1976], the Jackson-Yariv model for diffusion of product adoption [Jackson
and Yariv 2005], the Flickr diffusion model [Cha et al. 2009a], and homophilic
models [Aral et al. 2009] can all be expressed as GAPs.
cGAPs extend GAPs by adding a single rule called a Vertex Choice (VC) Rule
inspired by Sacca` and Zaniolo[Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990] for classical Datalog. Every
cGAP consists of a GAP together with a single vertex choice rule.
Definition 3.4 Vertex choice (VC) rule. Suppose {a1, . . . , am} and {b1, . . . , bm}
are two ordered sets of vertex predicate symbols. Then
b1(X), . . . , bm(X)←↩ a1(X), . . . , am(X)
is a vertex choice (VC) rule of size m for the vertex X. A VC-rule is ground iff
there are no occurrence of variables from V in it. 2
Note that edge predicate symbols cannot appear anywhere inside a VC-rule. More-
over, usually, only conflicting predicate symbols occur within a VC-rule and usually
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the predicate symbol bi is the decision predicate corresponding to a utility predicate
ai. VC-rules do not contain any annotations.
For instance,
voteToryD(X), voteLabourD(X) ←↩ voteToryU (X), voteLabourU (X)
is a VC-rule from our earlier example. Intuitively, this rule says that if voteToryU (X),
voteLabourU (X) are true, then exactly one of voteToryD(X), voteLabourD(X) can
be true and that a choice must be made.
Definition 3.5 Choice GAP. A Choice GAP (cGAP) Π is a finite set of anno-
tated rules plus a single vertex choice rule.
Though choice rules have only been applied in classical Datalog settings in the past
and their combination with GAPs is new, we do not claim this as a major con-
tribution of this paper as the combination is straightforward. However, the use of
ChoiceGAPs for modeling competitive diffusion, and the new notions of equilibria we
introduce, together with appropriate complexity results, algorithms, and efficiently
computable fragments of ChoiceGAPs are new.
3.3 Semantics of cGAP
We are now ready to define the semantics of cGAPs. Given a cGAP Π, let atoms
denote the set of all ground atoms of Π.
Definition 3.6 Interpretation. Given a a cGAP Π, an interpretation I for Π is
any mapping I : atoms→ [0, 1] of ground atoms to real numbers in [0, 1]. 2
Thus, an interpretation merely assigns a certainty value to each ground atom in
atoms. The set I of all interpretations can be partially ordered via the ordering
 defined as follows: I1  I2 iff for all ground atoms A, I1(A) ≤ I2(A). I forms
a complete lattice under the  ordering. Given two interpretations I1 and I2, we
define their intersection I1 ∩ I2 as the interpretation (I1 ∩ I2) such that (I1 ∩
I2)(A) = min(I1(A), I2(A)) for all A ∈ atoms. Similarly, the union I1 ∪ I2 of
interpretations I1 and I2 is the interpretation I1 ∪ I2 such that (I1 ∪ I2)(A) =
max(I1(A), I2(A)) for all A ∈ atoms. We are now ready to define satisfaction.
Definition 3.7 Satisfaction. Let I be an interpretation.
—I satisfies a ground annotated atom A : µ, denoted I |= A : µ, iff I(A) ≥ µ.
—I satisfies a ground cGAP annotated rule r of the form A0 : µ0 ← A1 :
µ1, . . . , An : µn, denoted I |= r, iff I(A0) ≥ µ0 or for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
I 6|= Ai : µi.
—I satisfies a ground VC-rule r of the form B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am, denoted
I |= r, iff ∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that I(Bi) = I(Ai) and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j 6= i,
I(Bj) = 0 = I(Aj).
—I satisfies a non-ground GAP/VC rule iff it satisfies all ground instances of it.
—I satisfies a cGAP Π (or is a model of Π) iff I satisfies all rules in Π. 2
A key part of this definition is the satisfaction of VC-rules. For I to satisfy a VC-
rule r of the form shown above, there must exist exactly one pair (Ai, Bi) such that
I(Ai) = I(Bi) ≥ 0. For all other pairs (Aj , Bj), we have I(Aj) = I(Bj) = 0. We
now provide a simple example.
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Example 2. Consider a social network SN and two diffusion models DM1 and
DM2 relating to diffusion about the tendency to buy ASUS computers versus buying
Macs. For this toy example which will be used throughout the paper, we assume
these are the only two options of computers to buy (the same reasoning works if
there are n different computers to buy). We assume there are two vertices 1, 2 and
a friend edge from 1 to 2.
SN = friend(1, 2) : 1 ←
DM1 =
{
buyAsusU (1) : 0.6 ←
buyAsusU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyAsusD(X) : µ
DM2 =
{
buyMacU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyMacU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyMacD(X) : µ
Suppose we have the vertex choice rule
r : buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X)←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
Consider the two interpretations I1 and I2 shown below.
buyAsusU (1) buyAsusD(1) buyAsusU (2) buyAsusD(2)
I1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
I2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0
buyMacU (1) buyMacD(1) buyMacU (2) buyMacD(2)
I1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
I2 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.7
Consider the situation of vertex 1. Interpretation I1 assigns:
—0.6 to all ground atoms buyAsusD(1), buyAsusU (1), buyAsusD(2), buyAsusU (2),
—0.3 to buyMacD(1),
—0 to buyMacU (1),
—0.3 to buyMacU (2), and
—0 to buyMacU (2).
We see that I1 satisfies all the diffusion rules as well as the one VC-rule. Consider
the ground instance of this VC-rule with X = 1. Exactly one of the two head
decision atoms, buyAsusD(1) has a value greater than 0 (0.6) and this coincides
with the value assigned by I1 to buyAsus
U (1). Likewise, when we consider the
ground instance with X = 2, we see the same thing. Thus, I1 is a model of the
cGAP program Π = SN ∪DM1 ∪DM2 ∪ {r}.
In the same way, we can also establish that I2 is also a model of Π. 2
4. COHERENT MODELS AND STRONG EQUILIBRIA
The new technical contributions of this paper start here.
Though I2 is a model of Π in the above example, it assigns overly high utilities.
For instance, consider the second rule of DM2 with the substitution θ = {X =
1, Y = 2}. We know that for the ground atom buyMacD(1) in the body of this
rule after θ is applied to it, I2(buyMac
D(1)) = 0. But the head of this rule under
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substitution θ, which is the atom buyMacU (2) is assigned a utility of 0.7 instead of
the 0 that is the minimum needed for this rule to be satisfied. In order to address
this, we define the concept of a coherent model.
Definition 4.1 Coherence Transformation. Suppose Π is a cGAP, r ∈ ground(Π)
is an instance of the single VC-rule in Π, and I an interpretation. Suppose r has
the form B1(v), . . . , Bm(v) ←↩ A1(v), . . . , Am(v) The coherence-transform of r is
the set coh(r, I) = {Bi(v) : µ← Ai(v) : µ | I(Ai(v)) > 0 and I(Ai(v)) = I(Bi(v))}.
Note that this set can be empty.
The coherence transform of Π w.r.t. I is simply the GAP ground(Πnon vc) ∪⋃
r ∈ ground(Π)∧
r is a VC-rule
coh(r, I), where Πnon vc is the set of all non-VC rules in Π.
Thus, the coherence transform of Π w.r.t. I simply looks at ground VC-rules in
ground(Π). If there is a ground atom Ai(v) in the body of the rule such that
I(Ai(v)) > 0 and I(Ai(v)) = I(Bi(v)), then we include the GAP rule Bi(v) :
I(Bi(v)) ← Ai(v) : I(Bi(v)) in coh(Π, I) — otherwise we just get rid of the rule.
All non-VC rules of Π are included in coh(Π, I). Thus, coh(Π, I) is always a GAP
which, by [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992], is guaranteed to have a unique minimal
model. We use MM(Π) to denote the minimum model of a GAP Π. We can now
define coherent models.
Definition 4.2 Coherent model. Let Π be a cGAP and let M be a model for Π.
M is a coherent model for Π iff it is the minimum model of the GAP coh(Π,M). 2
We now present a quick example of coherent models.
Example 3. We show that the model I1 from Example 2 is a coherent model
for the cGAP Π below.
Π =

friend(1, 2) : 1 ←
buyAsusU (1) : 0.6 ←
buyAsusU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyAsusD(X) : µ
buyMacU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyMacU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyMacD(X) : µ
buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X) ←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
Let r be the single VC-rule in Π. By grounding Π we obtain
ground(Π) =

friend(1, 2) : 1 ←
buyAsusU (1) : 0.6 ←
buyAsusU (2) : 0.6 ← friend(1, 2) : 1, buyAsusD(1) : 0.6
buyMacU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyMacD(1), buyAsusD(1) ←↩ buyMacU (1), buyAsusU (1)
buyMacD(2), buyAsusD(2) ←↩ buyMacU (2), buyAsusU (2)
Consider each of the two ground VC-rules above. For the first VC-rule, we see
that I1(buyMac
D(1)) 6= I1(buyMacU (1)) and I1(buyAsusD(1)) = I1(buyAsusU (1))
= 0.6 > 0. Hence, the rule
buyAsusD(1) : 0.6 ← buyAsusU (1) : 0.6
belongs to the set coh(r, I1), and gets added to the coherent transform of Π w.r.t.
I1, denoted by Π
′ in the following. Likewise, with the second VC-rule, we know that
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Algorithm 1 Non-deterministic algorithm enumerating all coherent models.
1: procedure coherentModel(cGAP program Π, m competing choices)
2: Let Π′ = ground(Π)
3: X = {r | r ∈ ground(Π) and r is a VC-rule }.
4: Π′ = Π′ −X.
5: for each vertex choice rule B1(v), . . . , Bm(v)←↩ A1(v), . . . , Am(v) in X do
6: guess a choice i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
7: insert the rule Bi(v) : µ← Ai(v) : µ into Π′
8: end for
9: Let I be the minimum model of Π′
10: if I satisfies every vertex choice rule in X then
11: return I
12: else fail
13: end if
14: end procedure
I1(buyMac
D(2)) = I1(buyMac
U (2)) = 0, and I1(buyAsus
D(2)) = I1(buyAsus
U (2))
= 0.6 > 0 and so we add the following GAP rule to Π′:
buyAsusD(2) : 0.6 ← buyAsusU (2) : 0.6.
The final GAP Π′ that we get is the following:
Π′ =

friend(1, 2) : 1 ←
buyAsusU (1) : 0.6 ←
buyAsusU (2) : 0.6 ← friend(1, 2) : 1, buyAsusD(1) : 0.6
buyMacU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyAsusD(1) : 0.6 ← buyAsusU (1) : 0.6
buyAsusD(2) : 0.6 ← buyAsusU (2) : 0.6
It is easy to see that I1 is the minimal model of Π
′. Hence, I1 is a coherent model
of Π. 2
Algorithm 1 presents a non-deterministic naive algorithm to compute all coherent
models of Π. The algorithm looks at each VC-rule and non-deterministically chooses
a pair (Ai(v), Bi(v)). If we think of these as the appropriate pair of atoms from the
VC-rule, we insert the annotated rule Bi(v) : Y ← Ai(v) : Y . Such a rule is added
for each ground VC-rule instance and we then compute the minimal model of the
resulting GAP. If this minimal model satisfies every VC-rule, then it is clearly a
coherent model — otherwise it is not.
The following result shows that the coherentModel function correctly finds the
set of all coherent models.
Proposition 4.3. Algorithm 1 returns the set of all coherent models.
We now introduce the concept of strong equilibrium.
Definition 4.4 Strong Equilibrium. A coherent model I is a strong equilibrium
for a cGAP Π iff for each ground vertex choice rule of the form B1, . . . , Bm ←↩
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A1, . . . , Am it is the case that
m∑
i=1
I(Bi) = max(I(A1), . . . , I(Am))
2
Recall that by the definition of VC-rule satisfaction, there exists only one Bi
such that I(Bi) ≥ 0, while, for all other Bj , for j 6= i, I(Bj) = 0. Thus, a strong
equilibrium is a coherent model where each choice coincides with the maximum
annotation value, taken as a measure of utility, in the VC-rule body. We use SE(Π)
to denote the set of all strong equilibria of a cGAP Π. The set of all strong equilibria
can be computed by enumerating all coherent models using Algorithm 1, and then
selecting those models that are also strong equilibria.
Example 4. The coherent model I1 from Examples 2 and 3 is a strong equilib-
rium because
I1(buyAsus
D(1)) + I1(buyMac
D(1)) = 0.6 + 0.0 =
= max(I1(buyAsus
U (1)), I1(buyMac
U (1))) = max(0.6, 0.3) = 0.6
and
I1(buyAsus
D(2)) + I1(buyMac
D(2)) = 0.6 + 0.0 =
= max(I1(buyAsus
U (2)), I1(buyMac
U (2))) = max(0.6, 0.3) = 0.6
2
We are now ready to define when a cGAP entails an annotated atom.
Definition 4.5 Entailment. A cGAP Π entails a ground annotated atom AA,
denoted Π |= AA, iff every strong equilibrium of Π satisfies AA. 2
5. CGAPS : A GAME PERSPECTIVE
Let Π be a cGAP, SN be a social network, and let n be the number of vertices in
SN. Each vertex v is considered to be a player Pv. We use ΓΠ to denote the set of all
players in Π. In this section, we first describe the concept of a state (which basically
is an a mapping of players to actions, specifying the action the player takes). We
develop a formal definition of a Nash equilibrium for the resulting game, as well as
a relationship between states and strong equilibria for the game. This allows us to
go back and forth between states that “represent” a strong equilibrium and strong
equilibria.
Each player Pv ∈ ΓΠ has a the same set of actions (or strategies) Q = {1, . . . ,m}
where m is the size of the vertex choice rule in Π. These are the m competing
choices the player can make (e.g. buying an Asus vs. buying a Mac, or voting Tory
vs. voting for Labour).
A state S for a cGAP Π represents a choice for each player Pv and it is defined
as a mapping S : ΓΠ → Q.
Given a cGAP Π and a state S for Π, we define the notion of an induced ground
GAP ΠS .
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Definition 5.1 Induced Ground GAP ΠS. Suppose Π is a cGAP and S is a state
for Π. We define a GAP ΠS that can be obtained from Π and S as follows:
(1) replace each ground VC-rule r : b1(v), . . . , bm(v)←↩ a1(v), . . . , am(v) in ground
(Π), with the ground annotated rule bi(v) : X ← ai(v) : X where i = S(Pv).
(2) All non-VC rules in Π are also in ΠS .
Intuitively, when considering the ground instance r of a VC-rule in Π and a state
S, exactly one of the bi(v)’s can be true in the state as a vertex v can make exactly
one choice. This choice is the i = S(Pv).
Proposition 5.2. Let Π be a cGAPsuch that every predicate appearing in the
head of the VC-rule does not appear in the head of a GAP rule, and let S be a state.
Then, the minimal model of ΠS is a coherent model for Π.
Given a state S, each player has a utility value for each of its actions. The utility
u(S,Pv, i) of the player Pv performing the action i ∈ Q in the state S is given by
the value assumed by the atom ai(v) in the interpretation MM(ΠS), i.e. we set
u(S,Pv, i) =MM(ΠS)(ai(v)), where ai(x) is the i’th atom in the body of the VC-
rule. This value is the likelihood of the player performing action i ∈ Q according
to the GAP ΠS .
We assume that each player is a rational agent, i.e. he is motivated by maximizing
his own payoff.
Definition 5.3 state representation of strong equilibria. A state S represents a
strong equilibrium for Π iff for all players Pv ∈ ΓΠ
u(S,Pv, S(Pv)) ≥ u(S,Pv, i)
for each action i ∈ Q.
Intuitively, a state is a choice of actions, one for each player. In contrast, strong
equilibria, as defined in the previous section, is a coherent model of a cGAP that
satisfies certain equilibrium conditions. The above definition specifies the relation-
ship between states and strong equilibria so we can refer to the actions taken in a
strong equilibrium as a state and vice versa.
Fact 1. The set {MM(ΠS) |S is a state }, contains all strong equilibria for Π.
2
The above result specifies a set containing all possible strong equilibria - but not
all members of {MM(ΠS) | S is a state } are necessarily strong equilibria.
5.1 Nash equilibrium vs. strong equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a state where no player has anything to gain by unilaterally
changing his own action. In order to define Nash equilibria, we first define the
utility uˆ(S,Pv) of a state S for a player Pv as follows:
uˆ(S,Pv) = u(S,Pv, S(Pv)).
This definition says the utility of the state S for player Pv is simply the utility of
the action S(Pv) that he takes in that state.
, Vol. V, No. N, September 2018.
Serra et al. · 13
Definition 5.4 Nash equilibrium. Let Π be a cGAP and S a state. MM(ΠS) is
a Nash equilibrium for Π iff for each player Pv
uˆ(S,Pv) ≥ uˆ(S′,Pv)
for each S′ such that S(Pv′) = S′(Pv′) if v′ 6= v, and S(Pv′) 6= S′(Pv′) if v′ = v. 2
Intuitively, MM(ΠS) is a Nash equilibrium if there is no other state S′ in which
all the players can obtain a higher utility. Thus, if one player tries to perform an
action different from that in a Nash equilibrium (trying to raise his own utility),
this would imply a reduced utility for some other player, who may then try to
perform some other action, leading to an unstable situation.
The above definition of classical Nash equilibrium applied to competitive diffusion
in SNs assumes that each player has common knowledge about:
(1) the whole structure of the social network (and every vertex in it),
(2) for all players, how they think (diffusion model mechanism for each vertex),
(3) the strategies adopted by each other player.
All these assumptions are needed to compute the utility uˆ(S′, p) — unfortunately,
they are too strong for a real-world social network context. In most real-world social
networks, we have information on our neighbors but not on others. Likewise, we are
not privy to the strategies of the players and how they make decisions. Fortunately,
the important theorem below says that we do not need these assumptions — strong
equilibria can capture Nash equilibria for all games. We now recall the definition
of a generic game from classical game theory.
There is no loss of generality in the assumption that the set of all actions is
the same for each player. If some players have actions that other players cannot
perform, then the utility of performing those other actions can be set to 0 for players
who cannot perform them.
Definition 5.5 Generic game. A generic game G is a triple G = (Pˆ , Qˆ, Uˆ) where
—Pˆ is the set of players {p1, . . . , pn},
—Qˆ = {q1, . . . , qm} is the set of actions (the same for each player), and
—Uˆ = {uˆ1, . . . , uˆn} is the set of utility functions, one for each player, where a
utility function is a function uˆi : Qˆ× · · · × Qˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ <,
We now state our important representation theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Nash equilibria can be captured by strong equilibria
of cGAPs. For every generic game G = (Pˆ , Qˆ, Uˆ), there exists a cGAP Π such
that the strong equilibria of Π coincide with the Nash equilibria of G.
We now illustrate the above result on the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma prob-
lem.
Example 5 Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider the well known game of prisoner’s
dilemma where the set of players is Pˆ = {A,B}, the set of actions is Qˆ = {c, d}
(cooperate, i.e. confess or defect, i.e. don’t cooperate), and the utility functions Uˆ
are represented in the following matrix
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Prisoner B cooperates Prisoner B defects
Prisoner A cooperates (-6,-6) (0,-7)
Prisoner A defects (-7,0) (-1,-1)
For logic program readers, the entry (0,-7) says that Prisoner A’s utility when he
cooperates and B defects is 0, while prisoner B’s utility (when A cooperates and
B defects) is -7. The equivalent cGAP ΠG according to the construction in the
preceding proof is obtained as follows:
—we add the following vertex choice rule
cD(X), dD(X) ←↩ cU (X), dU (X)
—we add the following facts
cU (A) : 0.1←
cU (B) : 0.1←
dU (A) : 0.1←
dU (B) : 0.1←
where we used ε = 0.1
—by considering the scaled (in the interval [0, 0.9]) version of the utility matrix
Prisoner B cooperates Prisoner B defects
Prisoner A
cooperates
(µA(c,c) = 0.13, µ
B
(c,c) = 0.13) (µ
A
(c,d) = 0.9, µ
B
(c,d) = 0)
Prisoner A
defects
(µA(d,c) = 0, µ
B
(d,c) = 0.9) (µ
A
(d,d) = 0.78,µ
B
(d,d) = 0.78)
we add the following rules
cU (A) : 0.23 ← cD(B) : 0.1
cU (A) : 1.00 ← dD(B) : 0.1
dU (A) : 0.10 ← cD(B) : 0.1
dU (A) : 0.88 ← dD(B) : 0.1
cU (B) : 0.23 ← cD(A) : 0.1
cU (B) : 1.00 ← dD(A) : 0.1
dU (B) : 0.10 ← cD(A) : 0.1
dU (B) : 0.88 ← dD(A) : 0.1
The Nash equilibrium for the prisoner’s dilemma is the state (c, c), i.e. both
prisoners decide to confess. The minimal model of the program ΠG(c,c) induced by
the state (c, c) is MM(ΠG(c,c)) = {cU (A) : 0.23, cU (B) : 0.23, cD(A) : 0.23, cD(B) :
0.23, dU (A) : 0.10, dU (B) : 0.10} which is a strong equilibrium for ΠG, because
MM(ΠG(c,c))(cD(X)) ≥MM(ΠG(c,c))(cU (X))
MM(ΠG(c,c))(cD(X)) ≥MM(ΠG(c,c))(dU (X))
for X ∈ {A,B}.
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In a similar way it is possible to check that the minimal model of the programs
induced by the remaining states are not strong equilibria for ΠG. 2
The concluding message of this section is simple. cGAPs and strong equilibria
together can express the notion of Nash equilibria in general games. As a conse-
quence, in the rest of this paper, we will consider strong equilibria of cGAPs.
The following example shows a cGAP where there exists a strong equilibrium
that is not a Nash equilibrium.
Example 6. Consider the following program
buyMacU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyAsusU (1) : 0.3 ←
buyAsusU (1) : 0.6 ← buyAsusD(1) : 0.3
buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X) ←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
We have only two strong equilibria, one for each choice of player 1
buyAsusU (1) buyAsusD(1) buyMacU (1) buyMacD(1)
SEa 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.0
SEb 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3
The strong equilibrium SEb is not a Nash equilibrium because if player 1 changes
his choice (buyMac) to buyAsus, his utility increases (see strong equilibrium SEa). 2
5.2 Social Network Game and Obligatory Product Selection
[Apt and Simon 2013] define a social network game where all users of the social
network must choose one product from among a set of products and their utilities
depend on the choices of their neighbors. This paper defines a social network as
follows.
Definition 5.7. [Apt and Simon 2013] A social network consists of:
—a weighted directed graph Gsn = (V,E,W ) where
—V is the set of agents,
—E is a set of directed edges between agents,
—W : E → (0, 1] is a weighted function associating a weight with each edge;
—a set P = {1, . . . , h} of products;
—a function P : V → 2P \ ∅ associating, with each agent, a non empty subset of
products;
—a threshold function θ : V × P → (0, 1] associating, with each agent and each
product, a threshold value. 2
Each agent v ∈ V chooses a product in P (v). Let s denote the joint strategy of
the agents, i.e. s : V → P assigns a product to each vertex.
Let c0 be a constant in (0, 1] and N(i) = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}. The utility function uv,
for each agent v ∈ V and for each joint strategy s, is defined as follows:
uv(s) =
{
c0 if N(v) = ∅
1/2 + 12∗|N(v)|
∑
i∈N(v),si=sv w((i, v))− θ(v, si) otherwise
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Note that in the utility, we add the term 1/2+ 12∗|N(v)| in order to ensure that the
utility function returns a value in the [0, 1] interval. Obviously, this modification
does not change the game. We call this game, the Apt-Simon Social Network Game
and denote its by the tuple (Gsn,P, P, θ, c0).
Theorem 5.8. Apt-Simon Social network game and strong equilib-
ria of cGAPs. For every social network game (Gsn,P, P, θ, c0) there exists a
cGAP Π such that the strong equilibria of Π coincide with the Nash equilibria of
(Gsn,P, P, θ, c0).
The following theorem provides a new special case of Apt-Simon social network
games where a Nash equilibrium always exists and can be computed in PTIME.
Theorem 5.9. For every social network game (Gsn,P, P, θ, c0) where P has only
two products (|P| = 2) a Nash equilibrium always exists and can be computed in
PTIME.
6. CGAP COMPLEXITY
In this section, we study the computational complexity of various problems related
to strong equilibria. We start by noting that strong equilibria may not always exist.
This is due to two factors,
—there exist rule heads (or facts) containing a predicate symbol present in the head
of the vertex choice rule, or
—atoms expressed in the vertex choice rule have mutual dependencies encoded
within the GAP rules, leading to potential “conflict” and non-existence of strong
equilibria.
Examples 7 and 8 below show the first and the second case, respectively.
Example 7. Both the programs Π1 and Π2 do not have any strong equilibrium.
Π1 =
 buyMac
D(tom) : 1 ←
buyAsusD(tom) : 1 ←
buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X) ←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
Π2 =
 buyMac
D(tom) : 1 ←
buyAsusU (tom) : 1 ←
buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X) ←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
In the case of Π1, the VC-rule is not satisfied because of the presence of the two
facts containing predicates involved in the head of the vertex choice rule, while in
Π2 the vertex choice rule is satisfied. 2
Example 8. Consider the following program
Π =

friend(tom, bob) : 1 ←
buyAsusU (bob) : 0.5 ←
buyMacU (X) : 1 ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyMacD(Y ) : 0.5
buyAsusU (X) : 1 ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyAsusD(Y ) : 0.5
buyMacU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyAsusD(X) : µ
buyAsusU (Y ) : µ ← friend(X,Y ) : 1, buyMacD(X) : µ
buyMacD(X), buyAsusD(X) ←↩ buyMacU (X), buyAsusU (X)
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Since the vertex predicate buyMacU depends on buyAsusU and vice versa, a strong
equilibrium does not exist. 2
Our first complexity result shows that determining existence of strong equilibria is
an NP-complete problem.
Theorem 6.1 Strong equilibria existence complexity. Given a cGAP Π
as input, the problem of deciding whether there Π has a strong equilibrium is NP-
complete under data and combined complexity. 2
A major problem occurs when multiple strong equilibria exist. In this case, a
player who computes all of these strong equilibria may not know which strong
equilibria the other players might act in accordance with. Thus, he may wish to
know if a particular action he is considering is true in all strong equilibria. This
problem too is intractable.
Theorem 6.2 Complexity of truth in all strong equilibria. Given a
cGAP program Π and a ground annotated atom AA as input, the problem of deciding
whether Π |= AA is coNP-complete under data and combined complexity. 2
Finally, we show results on the counting complexity of strong equilibria. Not
surprisingly, these results also indicate intractability.
Theorem 6.3 Counting Complexity of strong equilibria.
—Given a cGAP program Π as input, the problem of counting the number of strong
equilibria is #P-complete under data and combined complexity.
—Given a positive integer k and cGAP program Π as input, the problem of deciding
whether Π has at least k strong equilibria is in PSPACE and PP-hard. 2
7. MILP STRONG EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION FOR LINEAR CGAPS
A cGAP program is linear if all rules have the form:
A : α1X1 + · · ·+ αnXn ← B1 : X1, . . . , Bn : Xn.
Linear GAPs were introduced in [Shakarian et al. 2013] where the authors also
showed that most classical diffusion models studied in the literature have linear
approximations.
For any GAP Π′, Kifer and Subrahmanian [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992] show
how to associate an operator TΠ′ that maps interpetations to interpretations as
follows. TΠ′(I)(A) = sup{µ| A : µ ← B1 : µ1, . . . , Bn : un} is a ground instance of
a rule in Π′ and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, I(Bi) ≥ µi}. [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992]
shows that TΠ′ is a monotonic operator on a complete lattice and that it has a least
fixpoint lfp(TΠ′). Moreover, lfp(TΠ′) can be computed by iteratively applying the
TPi′ operator.
Suppose ⊥ is the interpetation that assigns 0 to all ground atoms. Then TΠ′ ↑
0 = ⊥. For successor ordinals α + 1, we set TΠ′ ↑ (α + 1) = TΠ′(TΠ′ ↑ α). For
limit ordinals α, we set TΠ′ ↑ α(A) = sup{TΠ′ ↑ β(A) | β < α}. By the Tarski-
Knaster theorem, we are guaranteed that lfp(TΠ′) = TΠ′ ↑ α for some ordinal α.
Additionally, Kifer and Subrahmanian [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992] show that
lfp(TΠ′) = MM(Π′). A GAP is finitary iff lfp(TΠ′) = TΠ′ ↑ k for some integer k.
We can extend this to cGAPs as well.
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Definition 7.1. A cGAP Π is finitary iff, for all interpretations I, the coherent
transform of Π w.r.t. I (that is a GAP) is finitary.
If we compute the minimal model of the GAPs Π′ in Step (9) of Algorithm 1, then
we can develop an algorithm that uses mixed integer linear programs to compute the
set of all strong equilibria of a cGAP Π. The use of mixed integer linear programs
for logic program computation was initially proposed by [Bell et al. 1994; 1996] —
however, they did not consider either GAPs or Choice Logic Programs.
Our Mixed Integer Linear Programming algorithm requires having an upper
bound T̂ on the maximum number of iterations needed to compute the least fix-
point of Π′ for each possible choice in Algorithm 1. We assume in the sequel that T̂
is such an upper bound — later, in Section 7.4, we will provide a simple algorithm
to compute T̂ .
7.1 Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP)
In this section we describe how to represent strong equilibria via a mixed integer
linear formulation.
7.2 Variables in the MILP
We start by defining the variables in the MILP we are constructing.
—xtA: For each 0 ≤ t ≤ T̂ and each ground atom A, the variable xtA ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the value assigned to A by TΠ′ ↑ t. Consequently, we fix x0A = 0 for all A.
—zti : For each 1 ≤ t ≤ T̂ and for each GAP rule ri : A0 : µ0 ← A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn,
the variable zti denotes the value assigned to µ0 by the rule ri in the interpretation
TΠ′ ↑ (t− 1).
The following example will be used in this section in order to help the reader
understand the constraints used in our MILP.
Example 9. Consider the following ground cGAP program
r1) a1 : 0.3 ←
r2) a1 : 0.6 ← b1 : 0.3
r3) b1, b2 ←↩ a1, a2
and assume that T̂ = 2. Then, we have the following real variables:
x0a1 , x
0
a2 , x
0
b1
, x0b2 , x
1
a1 , x
1
a2 , x
1
b1
, x1b2 , x
2
a1 , x
2
a2 , x
2
b1
, x2b2
z11 , z
1
2 , z
2
1 , z
2
2
Note that as r3 is not a GAP rule, we do not consider it in the definition of the
variables z. 2
7.3 Constraints in the MILP
We now define the constraints of the MILP. There are 4 types of constraints in the
MILP. We describe each type below and provide examples where appropriate.
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7.3.1 Type 1 Constraints. For each atom A and for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T̂ , let
rules(A) = {rj1 , . . . , rjh} be the set of all annotated rules in Π′ having A in the
head.
—If rules(A) = ∅ and A does not appear in a head of a vertex choice rule, we add
the constraint xtA = 0. This corresponds to the case where A has no chance of
being true as no ground rule has A as its head.
—If rules(A) 6= ∅ we model the fact that xtA = maxri∈rules(A) zti by introducing a
binary variable uti for each rule ri ∈ rules(A), and the following constraints:
zti − xtA − uti ≥ −1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h}
xtA − zti ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h}
h∑
i=1
uti = 1
In fact, as xtA ≥ zti ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h} and there must exist only one rule ri for which
xtA ≤ zti (third and second constraints, respective), then xtA will assume the value
of the maximum zti .
Example 10. By considering the program in Example 9, we see that the only
atom A having rules(A) 6= ∅ is a1 for which rules(a1) = {r1, r2}. Moreover, only
a2 satisfies the condition for which rules(a2) = ∅ and a2 does not appear in the
head of the vertex choice rule. We therefore have the following set of constraints:
xta2 = 0 ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2}
x0a1 = 0
zt1 − xta1 − ut1 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
zt2 − xta1 − ut2 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xta1 − zt1 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xta1 − zt2 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
ut1 + u
t
2 = 1
ut1, u
t
2 ∈ {0, 1}
2
7.3.2 Type 2 Constraints. For each 1 ≤ t ≤ T̂ and for each rule ri ∈ rules(A)
of the form
ri) A0 : f(µ1, . . . , µn)← A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn, C1 : c1, . . . , Cl : cl
where c1, . . . , cl are constants, and C1 : c1, . . . , Cl : cl is a condition for the activa-
tion of the rule, we introduce
—l + 1 binary variables vt1, . . . , v
t
l , v
t
1,l, where each variable v
t
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, checks if
the condition Cj : cj is satisfied, and the binary variable v1,l checks if the whole
condition C1 : c1, . . . , Cl : cl is satisfied
—the following constraints:
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vtj − xt−1Cj ≥ − cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l} (1)
xt−1Cj − vtj ≥ cj − 1 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l} (2)
vtj − vt1,l ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l} (3)
vt1,l −
l∑
j=1
vtj ≥ 1− l (4)
−zti + vt1,l ≥ 0 (5)
zti − f(xt−1A1 , . . . , xt−1An )− vt1,l ≥ −1 (6)
f(xt−1A1 , . . . , x
t−1
An
)− zti − vt1,l ≥ −1 (7)
where  is a very small real number used to map the strictly greater constraints.
Constraint (1) imposes that vtj = 1 if x
t−1
Cj
≥ cj , while Constraint (2) imposes
that vtj = 0 if x
t−1
Cj
< cj . Observe that the above constraints are correct for
ctj ≥ . If ctj = 0, then ctj can be removed from the constraints. Constraint (3)
requires that if there exists a vtj = 0, i.e. the whole condition is not satisfies,
then vt1,l = 0, while Constraint (4) imposes that if v
t
j = 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, i.e.
the whole condition is satisfied, then vt1,l = 1. Constraint (5) imposes that, if
vt1,l = 0, then z
t
i = 0, while if v
t
1,l = 1, from Constraints (6) and (7) we have that
zti = f(x
t−1
A1
, . . . , xt−1An ).
Observe that the values of variables zti computed at step t depend on the values
of the variables xt−1A1 , . . . , x
t−1
An
computed at step t− 1.
We now present an example of Type (2) constraints.
Example 11. Consider the rule
r2) a1(1) : 0.6← b1(1) : 0.3
of the program in Example 9. We have just one condition b1(1) : 0.3. Hence, we
have the following set of constraints:
vt1 − xt−1b1 ≥ − 0.3 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xt−1b1 − vt1 ≥ 0, 3− 1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
vt1 − vt1,1 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
vt1,1 − vt1 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
−zt2 + vt1,1 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
zt2 − 0.6− vt1,1 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
0.6− zt2 − vt1,1 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
vt1, v
t
1,1 ∈ {0, 1}
2
7.3.3 Type 3 Constraints. For each ground vertex choice rule rp of the form
rp : B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am, we introduce m binary variables y1rp , . . . , ymrp , and
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the following constraints:
m∑
i=1
yirp = 1
and for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xtBi − xtAi − yirp ≥ −1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
xtAi − xtBi − yirp ≥ −1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
xtBi + y
i
rp ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
−xtBi + yirp ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
The above set of constraints means that only one variable yirp can be 1 (and the
others must be 0), and if yirp = 1 then x
t
Bi
= xtAi , otherwise x
t
Bi
= 0.
Example 12. By considering the VC-rule
r3) b1, b2 ←↩ a1, a2
of the program in Example 9, we have the following set of constraints:
y1r3 + y
2
r3 = 1
xtb1 − xta1 − y1r3 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xtb2 − xta2 − y2r3 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xta1 − xtb1 − y1r3 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xta2 − xtb2 − y2r3 ≥ −1 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xtb1 + y
1
r3 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
xtb2 + y
1
r3 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
−xtb1 + y1r3 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}−xtb2 + y2r3 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2}
y1r3 , y
2
r3 ∈ {0, 1}
2
7.3.4 Type 4 Constraints. All the previous constraints guarantee that each fea-
sible solution for them is a coherent model for the cGAP. To guarantee that such a
coherent model is also a strong equilibrium we have to add the following constraints
for each vertex choice rule rc of the form rc : B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am:
−xT̂Aj +
m∑
i=1
xT̂Bi ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Since only one xT̂Bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, can be greater than or equal to 0, and the others
must be 0, then
∑m
i=1 x
T̂
Bi
= xT̂Bj and the constraints impose that x
T̂
Bi
≥ xT̂Aj ,
∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i.e. the condition of strong equilibrium is satisfied.
Example 13. By considering the program in Example 9, we have that the con-
ditions establishing the strong equilibrium are:
−x2a1 + x2b1 + x2b2 ≥ 0−x2a2 + x2b1 + x2b2 ≥ 0
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm computing T̂ .
1: procedure computeT̂ (cGAP program Π, δ)
2: T = δ
3: while (oracle(Π, T ) = false) do
4: T = T + δ
5: end while
6: min = T − δ, max = T
7: t = b(min+max)/2c
8: while (min < max− 1) do
9: if (oracle(Π, t) = true) then
10: max = t
11: else min = t
12: end if
13: t = b(min+max)/2c
14: end while
15: return max
16: end procedure
17: procedure oracle(cGAP program Π, T )
18: Solve max
∑
A ground atom in Π x
T
A − xT−1A s.t. ILC(Π, T )
19: if (
∑
(A ground atom in Π) x
T
A − xT−1A = 0) then
20: return true
21: end if
22: return false
23: end procedure
2
Given a cGAP Π and the maximum number of iterations T̂ , let ILC(Π, T̂ ) de-
note the set of constraints listed above, i.e. the constraints of types (1) – (4).
From the constraint description provided above, we can derive the following trivial
propositions.
Proposition 7.2. Let Π be a finitary linear GAP. The set of type (1) and (2)
constraints has a unique solution that coincides with the least fixpoint model of Π. 2
Proposition 7.3. Let Π be a finitary linear cGAP. Every solution for the set
of Type (1), (2), and (3) constraints represents a coherent model for Π. 2
Proposition 7.4. Let Π be a finitary linear cGAP. Every solution for the set
ILC(Π, T̂ ) of constraints represents a strong equilibrium of Π. 2
The above theorems capture the fact that the constraints in ILC(Π, T̂ ) neatly
capture strong equilibria of Π.
7.4 Algorithm to find T̂ : the maximum number of iterations needed
Algorithm 2 provides a method to compute the maximum number of iterations
T̂ referenced above. Basically, Algorithm 2 uses a oracle that checks whether all
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm enumerating all strong equilibria.
1: procedure enumerate(cGAP program Π)
2: Let Σ = ILC(Π) and Sol = {}.
3: while A feasible solution s for Σ exists do
4: Sol = Sol ∪ {s}.
5: Let k1rp , . . . , k
m
rp the values assumed in s by the variables y
1
rp , . . . , y
m
rp
6: Add to Σ the constraint
|ΓΠ|∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
yjri(1− kjri) +
|ΓΠ|∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(1− yjri)kjri ≥ 1
7: end while
8: return Sol
9: end procedure
the solutions of constraints ILC(Π, T̂ ) represent fixpoints, and finds the minimum
value T̂ for which the oracle answer is true. Formally, the oracle returns true if∑
(A ground atom in Π) x
T̂
A − xT̂−1A = 0, i.e. does not exist a solution for which the
fixpoint is not reached, while it returns false if
∑
(A ground atom in Π) x
T̂
A−xT̂−1A > 0,
i.e. there exists a solution for which the fixpoint is not reached. Then, Procedure
computeT̂ increases T by a quantity δ given in input, until the oracle returns
“true” as the answer. Then, by using a binary search, it finds the minimum value
of t ∈ (T − δ, T ] for which the oracle still answers true.
7.5 Algorithm to find all strong equilibria
We now present an algorithm (Algorithm 3) to find all strong equilibria of a cGAP
Π by using ILC(Π).
According to Proposition 7.4, strong equilibria of Π correspond exactly to so-
lutions of ILC(Π, T̂ ). Algorithm 3 enumerates the set of all strong equilibria by
first finding one solution of ILC(Π, T̂ ) (step 3). It then adds a constraint (step
6) that performs a “cut” on the convex polytope defined by ILC(Π, T̂ ). This cut
eliminates the strong equilibrium s and no other strong equilibria. We then add
this constraint to ILC(Π, T̂ ) and continue the process of solving the now expanded
ILC(Π, T̂ ) till ILC(Π, T̂ ) becomes unsolvable.
8. VERTEX INDEPENDENT CHOICE PROGRAMS
As strong equilibria may not exist for all cGAPs we will define a class of programs
called vertex independent choice (VIC) programs, for which a strong equilibrium
always exists when the size of the vertex choice rule is 2. We use V IC2 to denote
this class of programs.
Definition 8.1 Dependency graph. Suppose Π is a cGAP. The dependency graph
G(Π) associated with Π has the set V P of vertex predicates as the set of vertices.
The set E of edges is defined as follows: (p2, p1) ∈ E iff
—there is a cGAP rule r with p2 appearing in body(r) and p1 in head(r), or
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—in the vertex choice rule
r : B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am
there is an 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that p2 appears in Ai and p1 appears in Bi. 2
We are now ready to define a VIC program.
Definition 8.2 Vertex Independent Choice (VIC) program. A cGAP Π is said to
be Vertex Independent Choice (VIC) if
(1) every predicate symbol appearing in the head of the VC-rule in Π does not
appear in the head of a GAP rule, and
(2) Suppose B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am ∈ Π and p1 appears in Bj and p2 appears
in Ai and i 6= j. Then there is no path from p1 to p2 in the dependency graph
G(Π). 2
A VIC-program is said to be a V ICm program when its VC-rule has the form
B1, . . . , Bm ←↩ A1, . . . , Am.
Intuitively, the VIC condition requires that the choice of a vertex is completely
independent, because (1) it cannot be forced by factors other than the diffusion
process, and (2) it is not influenced by conflicting atoms. Note that the Labour-
Tory example in Section 2 is a VIC2 program.
Given a VICm program Π containing the vertex choice rule b1(X), . . . , bm(X)
←↩ a1(X), . . . , am(X), and having dependency graph G(Π), we define m sets of
predicates Pred1Π, . . . , P red
m
Π of Π, such that each set Pred
i
Π contains all the pred-
icates obtained by a reverse visit (i.e with each edge inverted, e.g. edge (a, b) is
considered as (b, a)) of G(Π) starting from the predicate bi. Moreover, given a
state S, we can divide the induced ground VIC program ΠS into m independent
programs Π1S , . . . ,Π
m
S , where each Π
m
S contains all rules from ΠS involving only
predicates from PrediΠS .
Example 14. Let Π be the VIC2 program shown in Section 2. We have two sets
of predicates, i.e.
PredLΠ = { voteLabourU , voteLabourD, suptBrown, knows,
mentor, student, olderRel}
PredTΠ = { voteToryU , voteToryU , likeCam,mentor,
employee, idol, young}
Since the vertex choice rule is
voteToryD(X), voteLabourD(X)←↩ voteToryU (X), voteLabourU (X)
we have that Q = {1, 2}, where 1 is associated with the choice voteTory, while 2
is associated with the choice voteLabour. Consider the state S where the choice
for player A is S(A) = 1 (voteTory), while the choice for player B is S(B) = 2
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(voteLabour). Then the programs ΠLS and Π
T
S are
ΠLS : voteLabour
U (A) : X ← suptBrown(A) : X
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, knows(B,A) : 1
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
student(B) : 1
voteLabourU (B) : X ← voteLabourD(A) : X, olderRel(B,A) : 1
voteLabourD(B) ← voteLabourU (B)
ΠTS : voteTory
U (A) : X ← likeCam(A) : X
voteToryU (B) : X ← voteToryD(A) : X, mentor(B,A) : 1,
employee(B) : 1
voteToryU (B) : X ← voteToryD(A) : X, idol(B,A) : 1,
young(B) : 1
voteToryD(A) ← voteToryU (A)
2
The following result shows some properties of VIC programs.
Proposition 8.3. Given two states S1 and S2 of a VIC program Π, where S2
only differs from S1 in the choice of player p, i.e. S1(p
′) = S2(p′) if p′ 6= p, and
S1(p
′) 6= S2(p′) if p′ = p, then for each player pˆ ∈ ΓΠ the following statements hold:
1. u(S1, pˆ, S1(p)) ≥ u(S2, pˆ, S1(p)).
2. u(S1, pˆ, S2(p)) ≤ u(S2, pˆ, S2(p)).
3. ∀j ∈ Q \ {S1(p), S2(p)} : u(S1, pˆ, j) = u(S2, pˆ, j). 2
Example 15 below shows that VIC programs are not guaranteed to have strong
equilibria.
Example 15. Consider the following VIC program where the size of vertex choice
rule is 3.
gU (1) : 0.4 ←
rU (2) : 0.4 ←
bU (3) : 0.4 ←
bU (1) : 1.0 ← bD(3) : 0.2
gU (2) : 1.0 ← gD(1) : 0.2
rU (3) : 1.0 ← rD(2) : 0.2
gD(X), rD(X), bD(X) ←↩ gU (X), rU (X), bU (X)
This program does not have any strong equilibrium. Moreover, observe that if we
remove any one of the facts, three strong equilibria exist.
The following result shows that the problem of checking existence of a strong
equilibrium for V IC3 programs is NP-hard.
Theorem 8.4 Existence of Strong Equilibrium for V IC3 programs.
Given a VIC cGAP program Π where the size of vertex choice rule is 3, the problem
of deciding whether Π has a strong equilibrium is still NP-hard under data and
combined complexity. 2
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm finding a strong equilibrium.
1: procedure findSE(cGAP V IC2 program Π)
2: Let S be a state s.t. S(Pv) = 1 for all players Pv ∈ ΓΠ;
3: while (S does not represent a strong equilibrium for Π) do
4: for all (players Pv s.t. u(S,Pv, 1) < u(S,Pv, 2)) do
5: Set S(Pv) = 2;
6: end for
7: end while
8: returnMM(ΠS)
9: end procedure
The following result shows that for VIC programs, all Nash equilibria are strong
equilibria, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Theorem 8.5. Let Π be a VIC program. Then every Nash equilibrium is a
strong equilibrium for Π, but in general a strong equilibrium for Π may not be a
Nash equilibrium. 2
8.1 VIC2 Programs
Fortunately, V IC2 programs have two nice properties. First, they are guaranteed to
have a strong equilibrium. And second, the problem of finding a strong equilibrium
can be solved in polynomial time.
Algorithm 4 shows how to find such a strong equilibrium. We use the concept
of state defined in Section 5. We start (line 2) by creating an initial state where
all players take action 1 (of the two actions 1, 2 supported by the V IC2 program).
Recall that for each player Pv, we have only two choices in V IC2 programs, i.e.
Q(Pv) = {1, 2}. If this state is not a strong equilibrium, we identify all players for
which a higher utility is obtained by performing action 2 (lines 3− 7) and if this is
the case, we set their action appropriately. Finally (line 8), we return the minimal
model of the induced ground GAP ΠS (see Definition 5.1).
Observe that a different strong equilibrium can be found by inverting action 1
with 2 and vice versa.
Theorem 8.6. Algorithm 4 runs in PTIME and returns a strong equilibrium
(that always exists). 2
From the set of all ground atoms of a V IC2 program Π, we can define two sets:
MM(Π1S) is the set of all actions in MM(ΠS) atoms linked with the action 1 —
MM(Π2S) is the set of all actions in MM(ΠS) atoms linked with the action. Let
S12 (S21) be the state identifying the strong equilibrium computed by Algorithm 4
(resp. by inverting the action 1 with 2 and vice versa). The following result shows
certain relationships about the utilities returned by the different minimal models
of GAPs depending upon our choice of S.
Theorem 8.7 Maximal and Minimal models. Suppose Π is a V IC2 pro-
gram. For each state S identifying a strong equilibrium the following statements
hold:
1. MM(Π2S12) MM(Π2S) MM(Π2S21)
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2. MM(Π1S21) MM(Π1S) MM(Π1S12) 2
The following result shows that checking whether an action is true in all strong
equilibria is polynomially solvable in the case of V IC2 programs.
Proposition 8.8 Entailment in V IC2 . Given a V IC2 program Π and a
ground annotated atom AA, the problem of deciding whether Π |= AA is in PTIME
under data and combined complexity. 2
The result below, however, states that checking for existence of strong equilibria
different from MM(ΠS21) and MM(ΠS12) is still computationally intractable.
Theorem 8.9. The problem of deciding whether there exists a strong equilib-
rium M different from MM(ΠS21) and MM(ΠS12) is NP-hard under data and
combined complexity. 2
The following result shows complexity results for counting problems associated
with V IC2 programs.
Theorem 8.10.
—Given a VIC2 program Π, the problem of counting the number of strong equilibria
is #P-hard under data and combined complexity.
—Given a positive integer k and VIC2 program Π, the problem of deciding whether
Π has at least k strong equilibria is PP-hard. 2
At this point, since the number of strong equilibria for a VIC2 program can
be exponential, the question is whether it is possible to enumerate all the strong
equilibria by using a polynomial total time algorithm. We recall that an algorithm
generating all configurations that satisfy a given specification is said to be polyno-
mial total time [Johnson et al. 1988] if the time required to output all configurations
is bounded by a polynomial in n (the size of the input) and C (the number of con-
figurations). Unfortunately, as stated in Proposition 8.11, this is not possible unless
P = NP.
Proposition 8.11. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for generating
all the strong equilibria of a VIC2 program, then P = NP. 2
9. ESTIMATION QUERIES AND COMPETITIVE DIFFUSION
In this section, we look at the problem of estimating the diffusion of concepts when
competing diffusions are involved. We view these as queries that we call “estimation
queries”.
Let Π be a cGAP and b1(X), . . . , bm(X) ←↩ a1(X), . . . , am(X) be its vertex
choice rule. Then, for each atom bi(X), i = 1, . . . ,m, we have an additional choice
atom c bi(X), assuming a value in the (binary) set {0, 1}, specifying whether the
player X chose the action bi. Given an interpretation I, let I(c bi(X)) = 1 if player
X chose action bi — otherwise I(c bi(X)) = 0. We use C(Π) to denote the set of
all choice atoms c bi(X). Choice atoms have been introduced in order to correctly
compute queries involving estimated diffusion through the network.
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Definition 9.1 Estimation Query. An estimation query (or just query for short)
Q over a cGAP Π is a pair
Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), {A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn}〉
where f(µ1, . . . , µn) is a generic function computable in PTIME, and {A1 : µ1, . . . ,
An : µn} is a collection of ground atoms of Π ∪ C(Π).
Intuitively, this estimation query takes as input, a set {A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn} of
ground annotated atoms and a function that aggregates the µi’s together. The
annotated atoms specify which annotated atoms are important in estimating some
quantity, and the function f specifies how these annotations are to be merged
together into a single annotation. The function f is often an aggregation function
such as sum, count, etc. The following example provides an illustration of this
concept.
Example 16. Consider the example about the Labour-Tory election presented in
Section 2, and suppose we are interested in estimating the number of persons voting
for Labour. This can be expressed as the estimation estimation query
Q = 〈sum(µ), {c voteLabourD(X) : µ | X ∈ V}〉
We use the function sum instead of count since the value µ assumed by each of the
atoms c voteLabourD(X) can be only 0 or 1. 2
Let Π be a cGAP, and let Q be an estimation query over Π. We say that a value
a is a possible answer to estimation query Q w.r.t. a cGAP Π if there is a strong
equilibrium M for Π such that f(M(A1), . . . ,M(An)) = a. We write poss(Π,Q) to
denote the set of all possible answers of the estimation query Q over Π.
We consider the following semantics to the estimation query Q over Π.
Definition 9.2 Range Answer. The range answer is the interval
[LQ;UQ] = [glb(poss(Π,Q)); lub(poss(Π,Q))]
where glb and lub stand, respectively, for greatest lower bound and least upper
bound.
Example 17. Consider the VIC2 cGAP Π of Example 6, where we have only
two strong equilibria, namely SEa and SEb:
buyAsusU (1) buyAsusD(1) buyMacU (1) buyMacD(1)
SEa 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.0
SEb 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3
Suppose we want to know the confidence that vertex 1 has in buying an Asus, i.e.
our estimation estimation query is Q = 〈sum(µ), {buyAsusD(1) : µ}〉. We have that
poss(Π,Q) = {0.3, 0.6}, and then glb(poss(Π,Q)) = 0.3 and lub(poss(Π,Q)) =
0.6. Thus, the range answer to the estimation query Q is the interval [0.3, 0.6].
By considering now the estimation query Q′ = 〈1 − sum(µ), {buyAsusD(1) : µ}〉
we have that the range answer is the interval [0.4, 0.7]. 2
The following result says that the complexity of determining the range answer to
an estimation query is intractable.
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Algorithm 5 Naive range answer computation.
1: procedure rangeAns(cGAP Π, Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), {A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn}〉)
2: Compute the set SM of all coherent models by using Algorithm 1
3: glb = −∞ lub = +∞
4: for each M ∈ SM do
5: if M is a strong equilibrium then
6: Let q be the result of computing Q over M
7: if q > lub then lub = q
8: end if
9: if q < glb then glb = q
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: return [glb, lub]
14: end procedure
Theorem 9.3. Given a cGAP Π, an estimation query Q over Π and a possible
answer a of Q, the problem of decide whether a = glb(poss(Π,Q)) (resp. a =
lub(poss(Π,Q))) is in DP and co-NP-hard. 2
Algorithm 5 shows a straightforward method to compute the range answer to an
estimation query. However, by constructing an appropriate objective function for
the MILP defined by constraints ILC(Π, T̂ ) from Section 7, it is possible to solve
the entailment problem and compute the range answer for estimation queries where
the function f is sum, count, min, or max. Even though count, min and max are
not linear functions, the expressive power of our MILPs allow us to express them
by adding other binary variables and constraints. In fact, using Type 1 constraints,
where we have the binary variables uti, for each rule ri ∈ rules(A), we are able to
model the nonlinear constraint xtA = maxri∈rules(A) z
t
i . This means that we can
also handle cGAPs whose annotation functions are nonlinear.
9.1 Monotone estimation queries
In this section, we show an important result. The range answer to queries that
are monotone (which include most things we would probably want to know with
respect to diffusion in social networks including sum, count, min, or max) can be
computed in polynomial time.
Definition 9.4 Monotone estimation query. An estimation queryQ = 〈f(µ1, . . . ,
µn), A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn〉 over a linear cGAP Π is monotone if, given two real vec-
tors x¯ = [x1, . . . , xn] and y¯ = [y1, . . . , yn] s.t. xi ≤ yi for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have
that f(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ f(y1, . . . , yn).
Theorem 9.5. Given a cGAP Π, a monotone estimation query Q over Π and a
possible answer a of Q, the problem of deciding whether a = glb(poss(Π,Q)) (resp.
a = lub(poss(Π,Q))) is co-NP-hard. 2
The above theorem says that finding the range answer to a monotone estimation
query is computationally hard to compute. Fortunately, the next result suggests
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that by considering specific interpretations, we can get lower and upper bounds on
the range answer.
Theorem 9.6. Let Π be a VIC2 program and let Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), A1 :
µ1, . . . , An : µn〉 be a monotone estimation query over Π. Then,
1. f(I(A1), . . . , I(An)) ≤ glb(poss(Π,Q)), where I =MM(Π1S21 ∪Π2S12);
2. lub(poss(Π,Q)) ≤ f(I(A1), . . . , I(An)), where I =MM(Π1S12 ∪Π2S21). 2
Note that the monotonicity of function f is necessary to prove Theorem 9.6 by
using Theorem 8.7 (also see Example 18). The following result shows that range
answers to monotone queries can be computed by looking at the minimal models
of certain specific GAPs.
Theorem 9.7. Let Π be a VIC2 program and let Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), A1 :
µ1, . . . , An : µn〉 be a monotone estimation query over Π. Let a1, . . . , an be the
predicate symbols appearing in atoms A1, . . . , An. If {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Pred1Π (resp.
{a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Pred2Π), then
—glb(poss(Π,Q)) = f(I(A1), . . . , I(An)), where I = MM(ΠS21) (resp. I =
MM(ΠS12));
—lub(poss(Π,Q)) = f(I(A1), . . . , I(An)), where I = MM(ΠS12) (resp. I =
MM(ΠS21)). 2
Example 18. Consider the situation of Example 17 and assume that buyAsus
is choice 1, while buyMac is choice 2. Then, SEa = MM(ΠS12) and SEb =
MM(ΠS21). By considering the monotone estimation query Q = 〈sum(µ),
{buyAsusD(1) : µ}〉 we have that glb(poss(Π,Q)) = SEb(buyAsusD) = 0.3 and
lub(poss(Π,Q)) = SEa(buyAsusD) = 0.6, and this coincide with the range answer
to Q.
If we now consider the non-monotone estimation query Q′ = 〈1− sum(µ),
{buyAsusD(1) : µ}〉, we have that glb(poss(Π,Q)) 6= 1 − SEb(buyAsusD) = 0.7
and lub(poss(Π,Q)) 6= 1− SEa(buyAsusD) = 0.4. 2
The following result shows that range answers for monotone queries can be com-
puted in polynomial time. In fact, Theorem 9.7 tells us that the range answer can
be computed by just using the strong equilibria MM(ΠS21) and MM(ΠS12), and
these strong equilibria can be computed in PTIME as shown in Theorem 8.6.
Corollary 9.8. Let Π be a VIC2 program and let Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), A1 :
µ1, . . . , An : µn〉 be a monotone estimation query over Π. Let a1, . . . , an be the
predicate symbols appearing in atoms A1, . . . , An. If {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Pred1Π (resp.
{a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Pred2Π), then computing the range semantics is in PTIME.
9.2 Linear Queries
In this section, we focus on linear queries. These queries can be computed on
linear cGAPs which are not necessarily VIC programs. Moreover, linear queries
can express monotone queries such as sum and count.
Definition 9.9. An estimation query Q = 〈f(µ1, . . . , µn), A1 : µ1, . . . , An : µn〉
over a linear cGAP Π is linear if the function f(µ1, . . . , µn) is computable in PTIME
and
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—f is expressed by a linear function k + cT1 x¯ + c
T
2 y¯, where x¯ = [xA1 , . . . , xAn ] is
the vector of variables associated with µ1, . . . , µn, y¯ = [y1, . . . , ym] is a vector of
m ≤ pol(n) real or integer variables, k is a constant, and c1 and c2 are vectors of
constants.
—xˆ and yˆ are constrained by a set of linear constraints Cf of size pol(n), i.e.
(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Cf .
Theorem 9.10. Given a cGAP Π, a linear estimation query Q over Π and a
possible answer a of Q, the problem of deciding whether a = glb(poss(Π,Q)) (resp.
a = lub(poss(Π,Q))) is co-NP-hard. 2
The following result shows that linear queries can be computed by solving a
mixed integer linear program.
Proposition 9.11. Let Π be a linear cGAP and Q a linear estimation query
over Π, then glb(poss(Π,Q)) is equal to
min k + cT1 x¯+ c
T
2 y¯
subject to
(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Cf
xˆ ∈ ILC(Π, T̂ )
and lub(poss(Π,Q)) is equal to
max k + cT1 x¯+ c
T
2 y¯
subject to
(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Cf
xˆ ∈ ILC(Π, T̂ )
2
Example 19. Consider the cGAP Π of Example 9 — its corresponding set
ILC(Π, T̂ ) of constraints is described in Examples 10-13. Let Q1 = 〈µ1 − µ2, {b1 :
µ1, b2 : µ2}〉 be an estimation estimation query. Then, the greatest lower bound is
computed using the following MILP:
min xb1 − xb2
s.t.
{xb1 , xb2} ∈ ILC(Π, T̂ ).
To compute the least upper bound, it is sufficient to change the objective function
to max xb1 − xb2 .
Moreover, we can express a count estimation query over the individuals that make
a specific choice by considering the choice atoms, i.e. the atoms indicating that a
player makes a particular choice, and setting the objective function to be the sum
of all the associated variables.
As an other example, consider the estimation query Q2 = 〈min(µ1, µ2), {b1 :
µ1, b2 : µ2}〉. In this case, the greatest lower bound is computed with the following
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MILP:
min y2
subject to
xb1 + y1 ≥ y2
xb1 ≤ y2
xb2 + (1− y1) ≥ y2
xb2 ≤ y2
y1 ∈ 0, 1
y2 ∈ [0, 1]
{xb1 , xb2} ∈ ILC(Π, T̂ ).
The least upper bound is computed by changing the objective function to max y2.
The max aggregate operator can be expressed similarly as min. 2
10. EXPERIMENTS
We ran experiments to check the scalability and accuracy of our framework in
predicting real-world election outcomes by considering Facebook discussions sur-
rounding the 2013 Italian general election. All experiments were run on an Intel I7
2.70 GHz machine with 8 GB RAM.
Dataset. We used a dataset extracted from Facebook. The dataset contains infor-
mation about Italian Facebook users and their Facebook friends, together with all
Facebook pages that each user likes. For each Facebook like we store the page url,
name and type (e.g. Actor/Director, Public Figure, Community, Political Organi-
zation, etc.). The dataset contains about 65 000 users, 84 000 friendship relations,
and 520 000 likes. The exact statistics are reported in Figure 1.
As our dataset was extracted after the elections, it contains a lot of user prefer-
ences about the political parties and/or politicians involved in the electoral com-
petition, expressed in terms of likes of pages maintained by political parties and/or
politicians. There were three main political forces or alliances involved in the elec-
tion competition, denoted by p1, p2 and p3.
For each user u in our Facebook dataset and for each party pi who participated
in the elections, we assigned a confidence value ρ(u, pi) ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and∑3
i=1 ρ(u, pi) = 1, that expresses how much the user u likes the party p, as follows.
—First of all, we classified the Facebook pages of type Political Organization or
Politician contained in the dataset (1002 pages) into three categories, p1, p2 and
p3, according to the content of the page.
—Second, for each user u and for each party pi we counted how many Facebook
pages of type pi she/he likes (we denote this value as #likes(u, pi)).
—Third, the value ρ(u, pi) is then computed as ρ(u, pi) =
#likes(u,pi)∑3
i=1 #likes(u,pi)
.
—Finally, we classified a user u as supporter of the party pi, if pi corresponds to
the maximum coefficient ρ(u, pi).
In our experiments we considered 4 competitions:
(1) p2 vs. p3;
(2) p2 and p3 vs. p1;
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Facebook dataset
Vertices 64889
Edges (Undirected) 83752
Vertices in largest WCC 64889 (1.0)
Edges in largest WCC 83752 (1.0)
Average degree 2.58
Density 3.98 10−5
Average clustering coefficient 0.465
Number of triangles 33857
Diameter (longest shortest path) 4
Fig. 1: Facebook network statistics.
(3) p2 vs. p1;
(4) p3 vs. p1;
For each competition, we constructed 20 (training set, validation set) pairs of
data to use in the experiments. We did this as follows: given the set U of users
having at least one like to a page of type Political Organization or Politician (a
total of 1 439 users), and a value δ ∈ [0, 100], we randomly select δ% of the users in
U to be part of the training set, while the remaining (1− δ)% of users are part of
the validation set. We used 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80 as values for δ. Of course,
our algorithm is then executed over the whole network (65K users).
Diffusion models. We used three different diffusion models in our experiments,
The first diffusion model is a kind of cascade model in which the likelihood of a
vertex adopting a political preference is the average of the likelihoods of its friends
adopting that position.
model1 :
choice1(v) : 1|nbr(v)|
∑
u∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice1(u) : µu.
choice2(v) : 1|nbr(v)|
∑
u∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice2(u) : µu.
In the second diffusion model, the likelihood of a vertex adopting a political
preference is proportional to the maximal likelihood of one of its friends adopting
the same position.
model2 :
choice1(v) : maxu∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice1(u) : µu.
choice2(v) : maxu∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice2(u) : µu.
The third diffusion model used in our experiments is a tipping model [Granovetter
1973; Schelling 1978]. It checks to see if the sum of the likelihoods of the friends of a
vertex adopting a particular political preference exceeds a threshold τ (the tipping
point). If so, the likelihood of the vertex adopting the same political preference is
the likelihood of the neighbor having the strongest political preference.
model3 :
choice1(v) : maxu∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice1(u) : µu∧
∧∑u∈nbr(v) µu ≥ τ.
choice2(v) : maxu∈nbr(v) µu ←
∧
u∈nbr(v) choice2(u) : µu∧
∧∑u∈nbr(v) µu ≥ τ.
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Fig. 2: Average AUROC (y-axis) as we vary the size of the training set (x-axis) from 20% to 80%
of the entire Facebook data set.
Fig. 3: Standard deviation of AUROC (y-axis) as we vary the size of the training set (x-axis) from
20% to 80% of the entire Facebook data set.
For each competition-diffusion model pair, we computed the maximal model (M1)
and the minimal model (M2) using Algorithm 4. We assigned real utility values
to users in the training set, while users in the validation set were assigned a 0
utility value (because we will use our model to predict which of the two political
orientations these users prefer). The real utility values are computed by taking into
account the values ρ(u, pi). For instance, for the second competition the utility of
vertex u for p2 and p3 is u1(u) =
ρ(u,p2)+ρ(u,p3)
ρ(u,p1)+ρ(u,p2)+ρ(u,p3)
, while the utility of u for p1
is u2(u) =
ρ(u,p1)
ρ(u,p1)+ρ(u,p2)+ρ(u,p3)
.
Area under the ROC curve. In order to evaluate our model, we built a threshold
classifier by using bounds over the vertices’ utility values returned by the models
M1 and M2. For each vertex i, we have a lower bound L1(i) (resp. L2(i)) and an
upper bound U1(i) (resp. U2(i)) over the utility of choice 1 (resp. choice 2) for
vertex i. For each vertex i we computed the value f(i) = L1(i)+U1(i)2 − L2(i)+U2(i)2 .
The first term denotes the utility of preference 1 (choice 1) for vertex i, computed
as the average of the lower and upper bound estimates of that utility. The second
term represents the same concept for the second choice. f(i) captures the difference
between these utilities. When this difference exceeds a given threshold τ , the vertex
i goes with the first choice of political party. If not, it goes with the second choice.
We computed the ROC curve by varying the threshold τ , and used the area under
the ROC curve to measure the accuracy of our model.
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Figure 2 shows a graph of the average AUROC as we vary the size of the training
set from 20% of the overall data set to 80% in steps of 10%. For each value of this
size, we randomly selected a data set of that size from our Facebook data in 20
ways. Then, as mentioned above, another 4500 combinations of parameters were
considered, making a total of 90,000 experimental settings for each data set size.
We have a total of 8 data set sizes, making 720K runs in all in our experiments.
For each data set size, Figure 2 shows the average AUROC we derived. We see
that on average, the AUROC varies between 0.75 and 0.78 which is quite a narrow
band. Recall that an AUROC of 0.5 denotes random guessing and hence these
AUROCs show strong predictive power. Moreover, the predictive power seems
relatively flat as we vary the size of the training set from 20% to 80%, varying
by just about 3 percentage points overall, which indicates that we can get good
predictive accuracy even without large training sets.
Appendix A shows 9 tables that provide more detail, on a competition by com-
petition level, of the experimental accuracy summarized in Figure 2. Each table
corresponds to one way of assigning a diffusion model to how each of the two po-
litical preferences spreads, leading to (3× 3) = 9 tables in all. Each of these tables
shows the diffusion models used for the spread of the two political preferences, as
well as the AUROCs obtained with no perturbation at all. Each table shows these
values for each of the 4 competitions as we vary the training set from 20 to 80% of
the total Facebook data set.
Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of the AUROCs we obtained. This figure
shows an important trend, namely that the standard deviation stays small, under
0.05, even as the size of the training set varies from 20% to 80%.
Table I reports, for each competition and for each training set, the max AUROC
obtained, the corresponding diffusion model, and the running time. Observe that
the AUROCs obtained are all good except in the case of the first competition. This
one case is anomalous because amongst the users in the set U (i.e. having at least
one like to a political party), the percentage of users supporting party p2 (resp.
p3) is 44% (resp. 37%). However, each user u ∈ U supporting p3 has, on average,
59% of friends supporting p2 and 16% supporting p3. On the other hand, each
user u ∈ U supporting p2 has, on average, 70% of friends supporting p2 and just
6% supporting p3. It follows that the users in U that actually support p3 will be
denoted as users supporting p2 by the diffusion models.
Network perturbation. In order to ensure that our experimental results are robust
to (edge) noise in the network, we perturbed all the best scenarios of our Facebook
network shown in Table I in two ways.
Node Perturbation. We perturbed vertices by exchanging the utilities of the two
possible choices that a vertex might make in the training set with probability p.
For each case shown in Table I, we did this by varying p ∈ { 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%
}. The results are shown in Figure 4 (first column of plots). In general, for all the
competitions we observe the same trend: increasing p yields a lower AUROC. This
is because our framework infers the political orientation of all the vertices in the
network starting from vertices which like at least one political party in the training
set. If this initial knowledge is wrong, then the AUROC is lower than the case
without vertex perturbation. If the premise is wrong, then so is the conclusion.
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mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
2 3 20 1 0.572 26908
3 2 30 1 0.572 12276
3 3 40 1 0.559 27202
3 3 50 1 0.563 27089
1 3 60 1 0.572 9454
3 2 70 1 0.597 11720
3 3 80 1 0.577 27040
1 2 20 2 0.913 60823
1 2 30 2 0.894 58445
1 2 40 2 0.915 53038
1 2 50 2 0.925 54272
1 2 60 2 0.883 49449
1 1 70 2 0.897 44034
1 3 80 2 0.913 9331
1 3 20 4 0.927 9258
1 3 30 4 0.94 9421
1 3 40 4 0.925 9518
1 1 50 4 0.939 36696
1 1 60 4 0.942 35688
1 3 70 4 0.928 9401
2 2 80 4 0.949 35790
1 3 20 5 0.802 9219
1 3 30 5 0.782 9300
1 3 40 5 0.793 9681
1 3 50 5 0.805 9632
1 3 60 5 0.758 9577
1 3 70 5 0.799 9399
1 3 80 5 0.78 9527
Table I: Maximum AUROC per each competition and per each size of training set.
Edge Perturbation. The second method guesses a set GE of edges where |GE|
is a percentage p of the total number of edges in the graph. Think of GE as edges
that are wrongly represented in the graph. If an edge in GE is in the graph, it must
be removed. If an edge in GE is not in the graph, it is inserted into the graph.
Here too, we perturbed all the cases shown in Table I with the following values of
probability p: 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. An edge perturbation with p =100%
means that the number of the edges is at most doubled. The results are shown
on Figure 4 (second column of plots). In this case, our framework is robust to the
noise introduced, since we can observe very low variations between the AUROCs
in the perturbed cases and the ones without perturbation.
11. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first game-theoretic framework
for competitive diffusion which scales to large social networks and which has been
proven to have high accuracy.
[Kempe et al. 2003] proposes a framework for diffusion which is less general than
the one presented here. The authors study a different problem than that presented
in this paper - namely the problem of identifying the“most influential vertices”
in a network. [Kempe et al. 2003] does not address either competitive diffusion
or scaling to large social networks. Moreover, all diffusion models considered by
[Kempe et al. 2003] must all conform to a submodularity property. A key differ-
ence between the approach of [Kempe et al. 2003] and the frameworks here and
in [Shakarian et al. 2013] is that [Kempe et al. 2003] does not consider different
edge and vertex properties. Additionally, there are many diffusion models in which
submodularity does not hold — a simple diffusion model is presented in [Shakarian
et al. 2010] where submodularity does not hold - based on a property spreading
via multiple diffusion rules. This argument easily applies for competitive diffusion
models as well. It is important to note that [Kempe et al. 2003] is a generalization
of many important models in economics and social science such as [Granovetter
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Fig. 4: Network perturbation.
1978; Jackson and Yariv 2005; J. Goldenberg 2001] - which can be represented with
our logic-programming based framework as we showed in [Shakarian et al. 2013].
[Kempe et al. 2003] is extended to a competive scenario in [Carnes et al. 2007].
However, [Carnes et al. 2007] only allows one competitor to actively diffuse while
all others must be static. In our work, all competitors are active at the same time.
They extend the independent cascade model, and propose two models describing
how two technologies simultaneously diffuse over the network. In the first model
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(distance based), the vertex u influences a vertex v if they are connected and
their distance in the network is small. In the second model (wave propagation)
a vertex copies the adoption of a neighboring vertex randomly chosen from the
set of its neighbors that are closest to the seeds. They show that for the two
proposed diffusion models the decision versions are NP-hard, and the corresponding
influence functions are non-negative, monotone, and sub-modular. A small dataset
(8K vertices, 461 connected components) was used for experiments. From a game-
theoretic perspective, the paper found a best response to the first player’s move in
a Stackelberg game. In contrast, our work is applicable to any diffusion models, not
just three, we prove a host of complexity results and algorithms that take various
aggregate functions into account, and we do not require submodularity. We also
test our algorithms on a much bigger data set.
[Kostka et al. 2008] provides a theoretical treatment of a problem similar to
[Carnes et al. 2007] with respect to the spread of rumors. They addressed the
problem as a 2-player-game where the players are the competitors or rumors (in
contrast, in our case the players are the vertices). The first player starts by choos-
ing its set of seeds, then the second player makes his choice of seeds (the two seeds
sets are different). Rumors then propagate on the network according to specific
propagation models. The payoff of a player is computed after the diffusion has ter-
minated and equals the number of vertices that believes in the rumor corresponding
to the player. They show that computing the optimal strategy for both players is
NP-complete, as well as determining an approximated solution for the first player.
They analyzed several heuristics and showed that being the first to decide is not
always advantageous. Their framework did not include an implementation.
The well-known work of [Lieberman et al. 2005] in biology presents a competitive
diffusion model that considers the spread of a mutant gene in a population. As the
mutant gene is attempting to replace (and can be replaced) by “residents” - the
model is essentially competitive. The authors view the propagation of the mutants
and residents as a stochastic process - which is similar to the long-studied “Moran
process” [Moran 1958] in evolutionary biology - a non-graphical model which their
work generalizes. It is important to note that the model of [Lieberman et al. 2005]
so far has not been used in real-world algorithms and applications, but rather
has been used as a theoretical basis for drawing conclusions on fixation probability
- the probability that a single mutant overtakes a population as time progresses
indefinitely. Unlike this work, their model only has two competitors (mutants
and residents), does not consider multiple edge labels, or vertex properties beyond
mutant/resident. We also note that [Lieberman et al. 2005] has influenced work in
statistical physics and interacting particle systems such as [Sood et al. 2008] that
uses basically the same intuition - and differs from this work in the same manner as
[Lieberman et al. 2005] does. In contrast to these efforts, we allow more than two
competitors, allow vertices and edges to have property labels, and in addition, our
framework of ChoiceGAPs allows us to express a huge variety of diffusion models
whereas these other papers focus on just one type of diffusion model. We have also
proved a suite of complexity results and implemented scalable algorithms that avoid
costly Monte-Carlo style simulations typically used for such models (see [Raedt et al.
2007]).
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[Broecheler et al. 2010] presented a logic-based competitive diffusion model in
which they induced a probability distribution over the space of models of a anno-
tated logic program and hypothesized that the most likely “model” was the one that
was likely to happen in practice. This one model of the annotated logic program
was used to make forecasts (e.g. if the model said more people would adopt choice 1
instead of choice 2, then that is what would happen). However, no accuracy results
were presented. One flaw with this is that it is possible that the most probable
model has probability 5% and suggests that more people would adopt choice 1,
while the remaining models (carrying 95% probability of occurring) suggest they
would adopt choice 2. Moreover, even on networks of under 10K vertices, the algo-
rithm tooks many, many hours to compute. In contrast, the results of this paper
show far greater scalability as well as strong accuracy results.
This paper builds upon our previous work [Shakarian et al. 2013] in which we laid
out an annotated-logic programming framework for diffusion in networks. However,
this paper differs in several key aspects. The approach in [Shakarian et al. 2013]
does not consider competitive diffusion models. As a consequence, it utilizes a less
expressive semantics than the combination of choice logic programs and annotated
logic programs used in this paper. It contains no results on equilibria, and does not
provide any accuracy results. Second, [Shakarian et al. 2013] addresses a different
problem — that of determining which vertices in the network will cause a prop-
erty to spread to a maximal extend (w.r.t. a complex aggregate). The problem
considered here is determine how competing properties will diffuse.
The study of epidemiology is another important field where network diffusion has
been intensively studied. In [Shakarian et al. 2010], we showed that the well-known
SIR (susceptible, infectious, removed) model of disease spread [Anderson and May
1979] can be represented in our framework - the same intuitions can be used for
other disease modes such as SIS, for example. Moreover, [Shakarian et al. 2013]
shows that other well known diffusion models like the Jackson-Yariv tipping model
for product adoption [Jackson and Yariv 2005], the cascade model that captures
favoriting of photos on Flickr [Cha et al. 2009a], as well as homophilic models [Aral
et al. 2009] can all be expressed within the notion of a GAP. As ChoiceGAPs extend
GAPs, they can also be expressed within the ChoiceGAP paradigm presented in this
paper.
Further works about annotation and probabilistic logic can be found in [Kifer
and Lozinskii 1992; Swift and Warren 1994; Kern-Isberner and Lukasiewicz 2004;
Lukasiewicz and Straccia 2009; Leach and Lu 1996; Lukasiewicz and Simari 2013;
Lu 1996], while for other works about non-determinism and choice construct in
deductive systems see [Sacca` and Zaniolo 1991; 1997; Greco et al. 1995; Greco and
Zaniolo 1998; Giannotti et al. 2001; Giannotti et al. 1991; Pedreschi and Ruggieri
2004].
12. CONCLUSION
In real world social networks, multiple diffusive phenomena are competing for the
attention of the same individual. For instance, multiple competing Presidential can-
didates are competing for the attention of social network users. Likewise, multiple
phone companies (e.g. AT& T, Verizon, Sprint) are competing for the attention
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of social network users. Most past work (with a couple of exceptions noted ear-
lier [Kostka et al. 2008; Broecheler et al. 2010; Apt and Simon 2013]) have focused
on diffusion in a simple setting where only one phenomenon is diffusing at a time
In this paper, we take the problem of competing diffusions “head on”. We provide
a very general framework called ChoiceGAPs in which a mix of generalized annotated
programs (GAPs) due to Kifer and Subrahmanian [Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992]
are neatly combined with Choice Logic Programs due to Sacca` and Zaniolo [Sacca`
and Zaniolo 1990]. ChoiceGAPs extend the work of [Shakarian et al. 2013] where
no competition was allowed and a single diffusion was spreading. As GAPs were
shown in [Shakarian et al. 2013] to be capable of expressing a range of diffusion
models including a variety of tipping models, a variety of cascade models, the SIR
model of disease spread, the Jackson-Yariv model for product diffusion, a popular
Flickr diffusion model [Cha et al. 2009a] as well as homophilic models [Aral et al.
2009], the ChoiceGAP framework can express all such diffusion models.
Using ChoiceGAPs, we build a game-theoretic framework in which every social
network user is considered to be a player — thus the resulting game consists of a
very large number of players. We show that certain models of the resulting logic
programs can be thought of as “strong equilibria” models and that these models
have very nice properties, similar to Nash equilibria (whose direct use would require
making some unrealistic assumptions). We prove a host of results on the problem of
identifying the existence of such equilibria under a variety of settings, and provide
algorithms to compute them (or determine they don’t exist) that are provably sound
and complete. Because finding such strong equilibria can be NP-hard, we identify a
tractable class of cGAPs called V IC2 programs that have two nice properties. First,
strong equilibria are guaranteed to exist, and second, they are guaranteed to be
computable in polynomial time. We also show that monotone and linear estimation
queries can be polynomially computed. Hence, as the annotation functions in the
heads of cGAP rules are monotonic in the case of the Flickr diffusion model [Cha
et al. 2009b], the Jackson-Yariv model[Jackson and Yariv 2005], and homophilic
models [Aral et al. 2009], it is easy to see that these models all can be polynomially
computed.
This important result allows us to implement the ChoiceGAP framework for re-
alistic applications.
We round out the paper with a prototype implementation of the ChoiceGAP
framework in which we consider a real-world competitive diffusion situation — the
2013 Italian election which involved 3 major competing parties (and candidates for
Prime Minister). Using a data set that we extracted from Facebook, we show that
our framework and algorithm works well in practice, seamlessly handling social
networks with about 65K users and 85K edges. Our ability to predict the number
of those who like various political parties, even with generic diffusion models from
the literature, has an AUROC of 0.76 on average across all experiments done in this
paper. Learning diffusion models is not the topic of this paper — but we suspect
that with learned diffusion models, this AUROC would only go up.
Nonetheless, this work merely represents the tip of the iceberg. There is much
additional work that can be done. For instance, it is possible that competitive
diffusion is not completely exclusive. A person might say that he likes candidate
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A’s policy on immigration but likes candidate B’s policies on jobs. In the case of
phone choices, a person might actually own both an AT&T and a Verizon phone.
This suggests that a more general version of competitive diffusion is a constrained
choice diffusion where a person is constrained in the number of choices he makes.
Another major challenge is that of scalability. Though reasoning about competitive
diffusion with a 65K vertex network is an order of magnitude bigger than what we
have seen in past work [Kempe et al. 2003], it is not yet scalable to real social
networks which may have millions of users. A possible strategy to explore this
scalability is to coarsen networks along the lines reported in [Purohit et al. 2014]
which shows methods to scale influence maximization to networks with over 30M
edges.
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A. DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL BREAKDOWN
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
1 1 20 1 0.553 48239
1 1 30 1 0.549 41052
1 1 40 1 0.525 39886
1 1 50 1 0.525 42201
1 1 60 1 0.566 41203
1 1 70 1 0.574 39942
1 1 80 1 0.52 38657
1 1 20 2 0.895 44957
1 1 30 2 0.891 44725
1 1 40 2 0.897 43213
1 1 50 2 0.917 44665
1 1 60 2 0.88 41384
1 1 70 2 0.897 44034
1 1 80 2 0.912 40321
1 1 20 3 0.926 35758
1 1 30 3 0.938 38353
1 1 40 3 0.924 35286
1 1 50 3 0.939 36696
1 1 60 3 0.942 35688
1 1 70 3 0.927 34824
1 1 80 3 0.943 35621
1 1 20 4 0.799 39085
1 1 30 4 0.776 38115
1 1 40 4 0.784 36340
1 1 50 4 0.797 36592
1 1 60 4 0.754 35984
1 1 70 4 0.791 37878
1 1 80 4 0.777 36315
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
2 2 20 1 0.546 46052
2 2 30 1 0.557 39867
2 2 40 1 0.541 39858
2 2 50 1 0.528 40248
2 2 60 1 0.555 38539
2 2 70 1 0.595 38242
2 2 80 1 0.518 36198
2 2 20 2 0.906 42596
2 2 30 2 0.872 41465
2 2 40 2 0.859 40342
2 2 50 2 0.897 41834
2 2 60 2 0.875 38450
2 2 70 2 0.879 41731
2 2 80 2 0.901 37916
2 2 20 3 0.892 40180
2 2 30 3 0.887 41103
2 2 40 3 0.912 36643
2 2 50 3 0.937 39429
2 2 60 3 0.917 37722
2 2 70 3 0.916 37944
2 2 80 3 0.949 35790
2 2 20 4 0.711 37118
2 2 30 4 0.724 38111
2 2 40 4 0.752 35863
2 2 50 4 0.784 37085
2 2 60 4 0.702 37529
2 2 70 4 0.753 39792
2 2 80 4 0.752 37351
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mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
3 3 20 1 0.526 26896
3 3 30 1 0.558 27016
3 3 40 1 0.559 27202
3 3 50 1 0.563 27089
3 3 60 1 0.531 27041
3 3 70 1 0.554 26983
3 3 80 1 0.577 27040
3 3 20 2 0.678 26956
3 3 30 2 0.664 27059
3 3 40 2 0.64 27173
3 3 50 2 0.639 27104
3 3 60 2 0.612 27421
3 3 70 2 0.688 26999
3 3 80 2 0.631 26953
3 3 20 3 0.735 26951
3 3 30 3 0.68 27054
3 3 40 3 0.701 27112
3 3 50 3 0.723 27219
3 3 60 3 0.737 26901
3 3 70 3 0.719 26973
3 3 80 3 0.681 26978
3 3 20 4 0.666 26980
3 3 30 4 0.671 26932
3 3 40 4 0.681 27221
3 3 50 4 0.691 27216
3 3 60 4 0.662 27089
3 3 70 4 0.689 27020
3 3 80 4 0.699 27073
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
1 2 20 1 0.57 59887
1 2 30 1 0.543 54270
1 2 40 1 0.532 51231
1 2 50 1 0.502 51748
1 2 60 1 0.553 48869
1 2 70 1 0.581 48208
1 2 80 1 0.505 44480
1 2 20 2 0.913 60823
1 2 30 2 0.894 58445
1 2 40 2 0.915 53038
1 2 50 2 0.925 54272
1 2 60 2 0.883 49449
1 2 70 2 0.892 53510
1 2 80 2 0.905 45854
1 2 20 3 0.925 55210
1 2 30 3 0.934 50355
1 2 40 3 0.925 46006
1 2 50 3 0.938 48730
1 2 60 3 0.939 47193
1 2 70 3 0.927 47459
1 2 80 3 0.948 43050
1 2 20 4 0.777 56007
1 2 30 4 0.768 54425
1 2 40 4 0.777 49342
1 2 50 4 0.801 50165
1 2 60 4 0.73 50183
1 2 70 4 0.773 55897
1 2 80 4 0.764 49472
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
2 1 20 1 0.57 28224
2 1 30 1 0.543 27507
2 1 40 1 0.532 27992
2 1 50 1 0.502 28657
2 1 60 1 0.553 28987
2 1 70 1 0.581 29142
2 1 80 1 0.505 29956
2 1 20 2 0.908 27307
2 1 30 2 0.89 27655
2 1 40 2 0.907 27892
2 1 50 2 0.917 27811
2 1 60 2 0.88 29343
2 1 70 2 0.888 28694
2 1 80 2 0.902 30529
2 1 20 3 0.923 27011
2 1 30 3 0.936 27843
2 1 40 3 0.924 27659
2 1 50 3 0.934 27711
2 1 60 3 0.935 27715
2 1 70 3 0.912 27451
2 1 80 3 0.947 27945
2 1 20 4 0.777 27285
2 1 30 4 0.768 27341
2 1 40 4 0.777 27964
2 1 50 4 0.801 28070
2 1 60 4 0.73 28135
2 1 70 4 0.773 27540
2 1 80 4 0.764 28147
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mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
3 1 20 1 0.534 27986
3 1 30 1 0.556 27479
3 1 40 1 0.547 28009
3 1 50 1 0.534 29044
3 1 60 1 0.559 31017
3 1 70 1 0.595 29976
3 1 80 1 0.562 33081
3 1 20 2 0.769 27458
3 1 30 2 0.703 28111
3 1 40 2 0.783 28059
3 1 50 2 0.757 27854
3 1 60 2 0.792 29617
3 1 70 2 0.845 28810
3 1 80 2 0.845 31435
3 1 20 3 0.785 27032
3 1 30 3 0.81 27178
3 1 40 3 0.831 27742
3 1 50 3 0.876 27645
3 1 60 3 0.779 27737
3 1 70 3 0.831 27478
3 1 80 3 0.84 28035
3 1 20 4 0.69 27143
3 1 30 4 0.735 27257
3 1 40 4 0.756 28155
3 1 50 4 0.787 28089
3 1 60 4 0.72 28012
3 1 70 4 0.771 27695
3 1 80 4 0.764 28079
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
2 3 20 1 0.572 26908
2 3 30 1 0.546 27512
2 3 40 1 0.541 27206
2 3 50 1 0.508 27139
2 3 60 1 0.557 27412
2 3 70 1 0.591 26957
2 3 80 1 0.511 27141
2 3 20 2 0.909 26908
2 3 30 2 0.891 27089
2 3 40 2 0.904 27173
2 3 50 2 0.915 27125
2 3 60 2 0.88 27065
2 3 70 2 0.888 26989
2 3 80 2 0.901 26925
2 3 20 3 0.922 26984
2 3 30 3 0.936 27064
2 3 40 3 0.922 27153
2 3 50 3 0.935 27287
2 3 60 3 0.935 26959
2 3 70 3 0.91 26954
2 3 80 3 0.947 26973
2 3 20 4 0.776 26989
2 3 30 4 0.768 26972
2 3 40 4 0.779 27349
2 3 50 4 0.803 27583
2 3 60 4 0.73 27058
2 3 70 4 0.774 26963
2 3 80 4 0.768 27534
mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
1 3 20 1 0.557 11739
1 3 30 1 0.564 9714
1 3 40 1 0.534 9629
1 3 50 1 0.531 9693
1 3 60 1 0.572 9454
1 3 70 1 0.579 9977
1 3 80 1 0.527 9697
1 3 20 2 0.898 9403
1 3 30 2 0.893 9531
1 3 40 2 0.898 9573
1 3 50 2 0.917 9387
1 3 60 2 0.88 9617
1 3 70 2 0.896 9388
1 3 80 2 0.913 9331
1 3 20 3 0.927 9258
1 3 30 3 0.94 9421
1 3 40 3 0.925 9518
1 3 50 3 0.939 9660
1 3 60 3 0.941 9371
1 3 70 3 0.928 9401
1 3 80 3 0.943 9326
1 3 20 4 0.802 9219
1 3 30 4 0.782 9300
1 3 40 4 0.793 9681
1 3 50 4 0.805 9632
1 3 60 4 0.758 9577
1 3 70 4 0.799 9399
1 3 80 4 0.78 9527
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mod1 mod2 % Training set Comp AUROC Time (ms)
3 2 20 1 0.537 13838
3 2 30 1 0.572 12276
3 2 40 1 0.556 12266
3 2 50 1 0.545 12421
3 2 60 1 0.557 11861
3 2 70 1 0.597 11720
3 2 80 1 0.564 10992
3 2 20 2 0.871 13036
3 2 30 2 0.818 12823
3 2 40 2 0.858 13585
3 2 50 2 0.897 13735
3 2 60 2 0.84 13357
3 2 70 2 0.872 14152
3 2 80 2 0.884 11571
3 2 20 3 0.886 12856
3 2 30 3 0.865 13972
3 2 40 3 0.898 14313
3 2 50 3 0.932 15202
3 2 60 3 0.9 14936
3 2 70 3 0.919 15547
3 2 80 3 0.922 13825
3 2 20 4 0.734 14685
3 2 30 4 0.744 13716
3 2 40 4 0.766 13411
3 2 50 4 0.791 12101
3 2 60 4 0.72 12054
3 2 70 4 0.76 12297
3 2 80 4 0.774 11715
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